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
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MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES AND A DRAFT FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.(U)
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This study concludes that a return to conscription is unwarranted at this time. However, extension of current unfavorable trends will precipitate a manpower crisis in the All Volunteer Force, particularly in the Reserve Components. In order to insure attainment of national security objectives, reinstitution of the draft in some form could be required.

Recommendations include a three-phase graduated response focused on enhancing voluntary programs in Phase I. Phase II is a carefully structured draft to fill the Individual Ready Reserve and Phase III is a full draft for the active forces.

MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES AND
A DRAFT FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

TODD R. STARBUCK, MAJ, USA
B.A., The Citadel, 1965

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

THE SITUATION

On 30 June 1973, Congressional legislation authorizing the induction of qualified young men into the military services was allowed to expire. From a practical standpoint, inductions had ceased six months earlier after the draft call of December 1972. With the expiration of formal authority, the nation was without an active draft law for the first time since early 1948.¹ Henceforth, the ranks of the military were to be filled solely through voluntary enlistments. Initially, recruitment for this new All Volunteer Force floundered, particularly in the case of the Army. Not until May 1974 was the Army able to begin consistently meeting its monthly active duty recruiting objectives. Since then the Army recruiting efforts can best be termed a qualified success. During both FY 75 and FY 76, the Army exceeded its active duty objectives by a slim margin. During the past fiscal year 193,024 men and women enlisted, surpassing the objective by a mere 910.² These results could be misleading, however, since overall demand was closely controlled throughout most of FY 76 by a new weekly objective system which in effect precluded enlistments once all training spaces for a particular week were filled. Moreover, enlistment standards were periodically adjusted by Department of the Army personnel

managers as the pool of available manpower experienced both quantitative and qualitative fluctuations due to seasonal employment patterns and other market variables. Nevertheless, it appears that recruiting accomplishment for FY 76 was probably nearing the upper limits of market potential, given present policies, incentives and program limitations. Serious recruiting difficulties first became evident during the three month fiscal year transition period, when the U. S. Army Recruiting Command achieved only 96% of its assigned objective. The following quarter, the first of FY 77, showed a further decline of 94.8% of objective for the three month period.³

Sustainability of the All Volunteer Force was of vital concern to the Congress, the military and the public when the draft authorization was allowed to lapse. That an accurate appraisal of its long-term viability has not been forthcoming during the past four years can be directly attributed to the severely depressed state of the economy. This phenomenon coincided closely with the inception of the All Volunteer Force and has effectively precluded testing of the concept in a "normal" environment. National unemployment averages ranging between seven and nine percent of the total work force nationwide, and up to twenty percent in age group 16 to 19, have distorted the validity of any assessment. The pervasive, if not decisive effect of the nation's economy was recognized by the Defense Manpower Commission, which concluded that "the prospects for sustaining a peacetime All Volunteer Force during the next 10 years (1976-85) will be determined basically by the economic situation."⁴

THE PROBLEM

It was obvious to the All Volunteer Force planners that a standing Army of the magnitude needed to fight the Vietnam War was neither feasible nor desirable in the peace which was to follow. Thus the size of the active Army was reduced from a high of 1,570,300 during FY 68 to its current ceiling of approximately 790,000.⁵ In order to minimize any degradation of capabilities as a result of force reductions, the Secretary of Defense developed the Total Force Policy in 1973. It was designed to substitute Reserve Component capabilities for active forces wherever possible, and emphasized reliance on the Reserve Components to provide "the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces."⁶ Implicit in this expanded role for the reserve forces was decreased reliance on conscription during the initial stages of any future conflict. Unfortunately, the Defense Manpower Commission found that "the Total Force policy is still far from a reality, and the expectations of it may have been overstated." Its report also singled out the Army National Guard and Army Reserve for their continued shortcomings.⁷

Difficulties experienced by the Army's Reserve Components in meeting Total Force objectives will probably be compounded in the future by chronic personnel shortages. Determining the exact personnel status of the Reserve Components at any given time can be difficult due to the effects of several structural variables. For example, Congress authorized a minimum average strength of 400,000 for the Army National Guard during FY 76; however, it was funded for only 380,000.⁸ Regardless, enlisted strength in its Selected Reserve declined by over 29,000 during the period May 1975 to October 1976. During the same period the enlisted strength of the USAR Selected Reserve dropped by over 32,000.⁹ While the rate of decline has stabilized somewhat since June, 1976,

nothing on the immediate horizon would indicate that this long-term trend is about to be reversed. Again, the Defense Manpower Commission concluded that "reserve recruiting prospects in the next decade (1976-85) are even less favorable (than for active forces)"¹⁰ and Will Hill Tankersley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, recently noted that the "major problem facing the Reserve Components today is the maintenance of unit strength."¹¹

HYPOTHESES

Should our present system of military manpower procurement prove inadequate, there are a variety of alternatives from which to choose. While these various alternatives will be examined in some detail in Chapter 4, this study will focus primarily on only one of them. The major hypothesis is that instituting a draft solely to fill the Reserve Components is a practical alternative solution to the problem of declining Reserve Component personnel strength. Its existence as an available option has not been widely recognized until very recently. General Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Retired), made one of the few public proposals of this alternative in 1973.¹² Beyond his brief remarks, it appears to have received little consideration until late 1976, when severe Reserve Component strength shortages forced a review of alternatives. This study will determine whether it is a viable option and outline its implications were it to be adopted.

While playing a major role, the Reserve Components represent only half of the Total Force equation. The continued sustainability of the active force under the all volunteer concept is perhaps the most critical consideration, since failure here will have the greatest impact

upon both the military and American society. Therefore, the subhypothesis of this study will be that a properly structured Reserve Component draft would enhance active duty recruiting programs. In the past, compulsory programs have directly supported related voluntary programs by offering individuals subject to the compulsory program the opportunity to fulfill their obligations by selecting a personally more attractive voluntary option. With careful planning, the two systems would be mutually supportive.

DELIMITATIONS

The scope of this study will be limited to the active and Reserve Components of the Army. The Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve also contribute units and personnel to the Selected Reserve. However, they constitute only about 30% of the Selected Reserve, with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve accounting for the remaining 70%. While the reserves of the other services have experienced their share of problems, the Army's Reserve Components are the most critical to the issues discussed here and ultimately their needs will prove the most urgent.

While a wide range of possible responses to manpower shortages will be outlined subsequently, this study will focus primarily on analyzing and evaluating the option of instituting a draft to fill only the Reserve Components.

ASSUMPTIONS

Several important assumptions, stated below, will further limit the scope of this study. First, the philosophical desirability of an

All Volunteer Force is assumed, provided the nation is able to sustain it. This question has been widely debated since the decision to abolish the draft was made, but on balance it clearly appears to be the most desirable course of action. Initial skepticism within the Army has given way to general acceptance of a volunteer force. Necessary organizational adjustments have been made, commanders are generally pleased with the quality of volunteers they are receiving, and few military professionals would welcome a return to the draft at this time. Of course, inability to maintain minimum force levels could easily alter this outlook.

A second assumption is the moral right and obligation of a nation to defend itself, and to call upon its citizens to share the burdens of that defense. The fact that this assumption must even be stated is evidence of the degree to which it has been called into question by some segments of the public in recent years, although it appears that a national consensus favoring a strong defense is now growing. Given a situation in which defense manpower requirements are no longer being filled by the All Volunteer Force mechanism, the nation has the inherent right to adopt an alternative course of action which could include a compulsory draft for either active or reserve forces.

The final assumption is that the findings of the Defense Manpower Commission are generally valid. Specific recommendations are perhaps arguable, but the extensive resources and access to the Defense system enjoyed by the Commission produced empirical data as complete and accurate as any we are likely to find. During the two years of its existence (April 1974 to April 1976) the Commission conducted perhaps the most comprehensive review of defense manpower policies ever attempted.

Moreover, its survey and analysis appear somewhat more objective than the results of previous manpower review commissions which were established several times during the Vietnam War. The Defense Manpower Commission's findings and related studies are an invaluable source of information for any researcher in this field.

VALUE OF THE STUDY

As discussed earlier, drafting young men to fill critical shortages in the Reserve Components has not been acknowledged as a viable contingency alternative in manpower procurement until very recently. As the debate on the merits and economic feasibility of the All Volunteer Force grows, the potential of a Reserve Component draft as a solution has suddenly been recognized. Both the outgoing and incoming Secretaries of the Army have commented publicly on it.¹³ That a draft for the reserves is one alternative is now obvious; this study will evaluate its relative advantages and disadvantages. Having accomplished this task, defense manpower planners will have available a preliminary evaluation of this option should our present course of action require modification.

In order to place a reserves-only draft in proper perspective relative to other potential solutions, considerable time and effort will be devoted to an examination of the military manpower system, and the identification and consideration of all reasonable alternatives. Only then will an evaluation of a Reserve Components draft be attempted. Hopefully, this approach will enhance the overall value of the study. Establishing the full spectrum of available options and briefly discussing each one will facilitate our search for optimum

courses of action. Chapter 6 concludes by offering for consideration one set of recommendations.

DEFINITIONS¹⁴

Reserve Components. The reserve structures of each of the services, considered as a whole, constitute the Reserve Components. The Army's reserves are the National Guard of the United States and the United States Army Reserve.

Ready Reserve. Units and individuals of the Ready Reserve constitute the first priority elements liable for involuntary active duty in time of war, national emergency declared by Congress, proclaimed by the President, or when authorized by law.

Selected Reserve. Units of the Reserve Components designated for priority call-up in time of national emergency are considered the Selected Reserve. Statistically, they are part of the Ready Reserve.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Members of the Ready Reserve not assigned to troop program units normally constitute the IRR.

Standby Reserve. Personnel who have completed their Ready Reserve training requirements and those in several special categories comprise the Standby Reserve. They may be called to active duty only by declaration of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law. Under current law, no standby reservist may be ordered to active duty until the Director of Selective Service determines that he is available for duty.

All Volunteer Force (AVF). The force which resulted from the decision to abolish the draft has been designated the AVF to distinguish it from earlier conscript forces. It is also a concept for meeting the

military manpower needs of the nation and is applicable to all military components, whether active or reserve.

Total Force. The policy which established the Reserve Components as the initial and primary augmentation of the active forces was designated the Total Force Policy. Active forces and reserve elements are considered parts of a whole rather than separate entities. Planning for contingencies also incorporates appropriate forces of our allies into the Total Force concept.

Chapter 1

FOOTNOTES

¹ Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security, April 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 40.

² News Item, Soldiers, October, 1976, p. 56.

³ U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Recruiting Management Directorate, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, February, 1977.

⁴ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 417.

⁵ Ibid., p. 101.

⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 109.

⁹ U.S., Department of Defense, Guard and Reserve Manpower: Strengths and Statistics, 31 October 1976 (Washington: Department of Defense, 1976), pp. 5-7.

¹⁰ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 417.

¹¹ "Reservists to be Polled," Army Times, January 24, 1977, p. 12.

¹² U.S., Congressional Record, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973), CXIX, No. 183, H10307-H10308.

¹³ "RC Draft Plan Aired," Army Times, February 14, 1977, p. 2 and "Alexander Confirmation Hearings," Army Times, February 21, 1977, p. 22.

¹⁴ 10 U.S.C. 261, 673, 674. For additional explanation see also: Reserve Components, Programmed Text 135-1, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, January, 1976.

Chapter 2

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY

CONSCRIPTION AND THE MILITIA TRADITION

While the regular armed forces of the United States have a long and proud history, dating from the earliest days of the American Revolution, the origins of the Reserve Components can be traced back even further, beginning with the first permanent settlements on the North American continent. Together, the regulars and the militia have provided the military strength of the nation when it was needed to fight wars, open frontiers, or deter potential aggressors. The present All Volunteer Force possesses a unique heritage, arising from a synthesis of military and liberal-democratic traditions. Contemporary Reserve Component manpower questions cannot be effectively resolved without an appreciation of the origin and evolution of the All Volunteer Force and its corollary, the Total Force. This chapter will outline the development of military manpower policy from a historical perspective, and attempt to identify the issues which shaped the all-volunteer concept.

Prior to the French Revolution, military forces tended to take one of two basic forms. Most were relatively small, professional standing armies typical of the European monarchies of the 17th and 18th centuries. The remainder were citizen armies, again relatively small forces, but cheaper and less professional in nature. Citizen armies were often little more than collections of militia, as exemplified by

the army of the American Revolution. The French revolutionaries of 1793 broke with traditional form, however, introducing the concept of the "nation at arms" and the levee en masse. The success of Napoleon's armies, founded upon the total mobilization of the nation-state's resources, forced other European powers to adopt universal conscription during the early 19th century. Mass armies and total war were basic principles of subsequent military thought, and wars in the first half of the 20th century carried the concept of a mass citizen army to its zenith.¹

The United States, preoccupied with its own internal development, found little need for conscription prior to its emergence as an international power during World War I. The militia concept was firmly ingrained in the political philosophy of the young nation, and was generally followed despite its deficiencies in time of war. Serious manpower crises which had developed during both the Revolution and the War of 1812 were alleviated only by aid from France in the first instance and a fortuitous end to the war in the second. Limited conscription was introduced on both sides during the Civil War to meet heavy manpower demands which had begun to exhaust the available supply of volunteers and militia units. Opposition was widespread, particularly in the North, as evidenced by the bloody New York draft riots. In the end, however, relatively few conscripts actually served. The attractiveness of volunteering was greatly enhanced by the practice of paying bounties to volunteers. Conscripts, on the other hand, received none.²

A voluntary peacetime military of small size was sufficient for a growing nation over the next fifty years. By 1916 the likelihood of American entry into the First World War was so great that serious

preparations were initiated. The first "Selective Service Law" was introduced by President Wilson in April, 1917, one day after war was declared. After six weeks of bitter Congressional debate the measure finally passed. Once enacted, the law functioned well, registering 24 million Americans and inducting nearly 3 million during the next year and one-half.³

In the interim between the two World Wars, America reverted once again to a small, professional Regular Army. Nevertheless, comprehensive planning for possible mobilization in the future was now a permanent responsibility of the War Department. Closer association of the Regular Army and the National Guard was achieved in 1933 by an amendment to the National Security Act of 1916, providing that Guard units which met and maintained federal standards would be redesignated units of the National Guard of the United States.⁴ This statutory affiliation strengthened the bonds which had already existed between the regular and reserve forces of that day, as well as facilitating future mobilization. Despite the small size of the active Army, shortfalls in voluntary enlistments were a serious problem once the worst of the Depression had passed, and in the National Guard the situation was no better.⁵

As World War once again erupted in Europe in the fall of 1939, mobilization planning in the United States was accelerated. On 14 September 1940, the first peacetime draft law in the nation's history was passed and inductions, initially for training periods of one year or less, commenced soon afterward. The man who would come to personify the draft, then-Lt. Col. Lewis B. Hershey, was appointed the second Director of the fledgling Selective Service in July, 1941. When the

United States entered the war and gradually began to shoulder a greater share of the burden, the draft became the principal source of manpower. Of the 16.5 million men who served in World War II, 10 million, or 61%, were provided through the draft system. Unlike earlier conscription efforts, the World War II draft was the "first genuinely popular system of conscription."⁶ After Pearl Harbor, legal challenges and general opposition to the draft had virtually ceased.⁶ Unfortunately, future threats to the nation would never again appear in such a clearly defined form.

POSTWAR AND COLD WAR

Even as World War II moved into its final months, officials of the Roosevelt-Truman Administration and the War Department were planning the framework of the postwar defense establishment. An expanded role in world affairs coupled with increased military preparedness were envisioned for the future. To meet postwar demands for military manpower, the Administration developed two policy proposals: universal military training (UMT) and an extension of the Selective Service provisions. Universal military training was viewed by many as the most desirable course of action for the nation from a military standpoint, while the Selective Service would continue to provide needed manpower during the transition to UMT. Although Congress granted a one year extension of the draft to 31 March 1947, UMT proposals were rejected in 1945 and again in 1947.⁷ As the expiration date of the draft extension approached, reduced manpower requirements and increased voluntary recruiting success prompted President Truman's decision not to request a further extension.⁸ His optimism was short-lived, however, and less

than a year later he was forced to ask Congress for a new Selective Service Act. The emergence of an aggressive Soviet strategy throughout Europe, combined with the failure of the Army's enlistment drive, had forced an immediate reappraisal of the United States' capacity to meet potential threats overseas. The consensus of the Congress eventually supported the President's request, and after three months of debate passed the Selective Service Act of 1948.⁹

Following the brief experiment with an all-volunteer Army in 1947-48, the reinstated draft became a permanent part of the military manpower procurement system. Potentially meaningful debate on the indefinite desirability of the draft was cut short by the invasion of South Korea in August 1950. The 1948 law was replaced by the Universal Military Service Training Act of 1951, which, despite its title, did not actually provide for universal military training. Specifically, it increased the pool of manpower available for induction.¹⁰ Following the Korean War a full-time draft remained in effect despite the absence of actual military conflict. The degree to which Selective Service became an accepted institution in American life in the 1950's and early 1960's is reflected by the almost complete lack of opposition to extensions of the Universal Military Service Training Act in 1955, 1959 and 1963. Reduced military commitments, increased manpower supply, and expanded deferment policies all tended to reduce the impact of the draft on society during these years.¹¹

THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE DRAFT

The 1963 draft law extension carried an expiration date of 30 June 1967. Few could have predicted in 1963 the turmoil, bitterness,

and social unrest which would be generated during the next four years. Increased American involvement in a seemingly endless conflict in Southeast Asia brought a premature end to the relative tranquility of the early 1960's and precipitated a deep reaction against traditional American values of justice, propriety and morality. While the sound and the fury have now largely subsided, many American institutions were permanently transformed in the process. As the Vietnam War widened, the Selective Service became an early object of disaffection and recrimination. In the end, it was one of those institutions which could not survive the era. Given the diversity of subjective opinion on this topic, it may not be possible to judge its moral worthiness accurately. For the purposes of this research, however, it will be necessary to establish why and how it became one of the biggest casualties of the war.

As pointed out earlier, virtually no opposition had been voiced to the draft prior to 1965. But escalation of the war in the spring of that year launched what was to become an almost continuous attack on the motives and methods of Selective Service. As monthly draft calls rose to 20,000 and 30,000; as deferments became more difficult to obtain; and as casualty lists continued to grow, the workings of the draft system became an object of widespread interest and scrutiny.¹² Outside government, studies of the draft are almost non-existent prior to 1966; however, at that point a veritable flood of literature began to appear. Scholarly research and objectivity were not necessarily prerequisites for either supporter or detractor. However, the flagrant emotionalism of some critiques provided insight into the authors' biases. The following example is illustrative.

Wartime has a way of exposing the ugly facts and shocking us into a realization of what is happening. Our boys are no longer going on foreign duty merely to stroll the hills of Bavaria or the streets of Tokyo. Some 9000 have already been killed in Vietnam. About one in five of our soldiers in Vietnam are draftees. These young men, though many do not protest their obligation, did not volunteer to end their existence in the Asian mud, nor spray flaming napalm on helpless Orientals. They are coerced into servitude by our Selective Service System. No man between eighteen and thirty-five is free of the draft's ever-watchful eye. An institution so powerful that it controls the lives of 33 million young men, the very heart of the nation, should be ever watched itself to make certain it is operating on the highest principles of justice and integrity. That no such claims can be made for Selective Service is becoming monstrously clear.¹³

Frustration over the war in Vietnam compounded societal pressures which had been developing since World War II. "Racism, black nationalism, student radicalism, drug abuse and 'youth culture'" all contributed to the more serious problems which began to surface in the Army. Mutinies, disobedience, insubordination, drugs, and even outright murder in the form of "fraggings" reflected problems unresolved in the general society.¹⁴ However, some of the discontent had deeper philosophical origins, as Morris Janowitz noted.

In advanced industrialized societies, with some notable exceptions, the goals and style of military institutions have been subjected to massive criticism and the belief is that the moral worth of conscript service has been shaken. In part, hedonism and the importance of self-expression supply a new basis for resistance to military authority among young people. It is difficult to draw the line between highly personalized opposition to military institutions and broader, more moralistic viewpoints which generate a powerful sense of neutralism and new forms of pacifism. The sheer destructive power of weapons systems and the apparent feeling that political leaders are unable to control the nuclear arms race are essential ingredients.¹⁵

In this charged atmosphere the draft and Selective Service System proved easy marks for antiwar activists and their allies. The nature and complexity of the system made it vulnerable to penetrating

scrutiny; its somewhat disjointed approach to justice had, in the final analysis made it more unfair. In truth, the draft had serious flaws which justified much of the criticism it received. Perhaps the most distasteful was the manner in which the sons of the privileged were able to avoid induction, and consequently combat exposure, through the numerous administrative havens offered by Selective Service procedures.¹⁶ It was ironic that those campus activists who most frequently used the injustice of the system as a rallying cry in protesting the draft were themselves the sons of the privileged. Their critics often noted that the demonstrators had a vested interest in discrediting the draft which went beyond purely moral considerations.

Very little was heard about the "draft" when Selective Service was not conscripting college students or anybody that college students were likely to know. The whole question was merely boring when monthly draft calls were down to 1,500 or zero. It was not until they faced the very real danger of death, disability, or at the very least interruption to their careers that college students began to clamor for "volunteers" and decided that compulsory service was immoral.¹⁷

Perhaps the activists' fervor was fueled subconsciously by the guilty knowledge that others less fortunate were bearing the burdens of democracy which they should rightfully have shared. In any event, the dilemma was real and apparent, as President Johnson noted in his 1967 message requesting a four year extension of the draft. "The danger of inequity . . . arises when not every eligible man must be called to serve. It is intensified when the numbers of men are relatively small in relation to the numbers available."¹⁸

By the late 1960's it was apparent that reform, if not replacement of the Selective Service was a foregone conclusion. Faced with a 30 June 1967 expiration of the draft law extension, the agencies

responsible for military manpower policy, both executive and legislative, turned their attention to evaluating the existing system and exploring possible alternatives. In addition to substantial study in the private sector, three major governmental studies were reviewed or initiated to identify and resolve the more pressing issues generated by the draft. The first was the Defense Manpower Study, an internal project of the Department of Defense. Reputedly a comprehensive study of national manpower questions, it had been completed by July, 1965, but never released to the public. The decision by the Administration to withhold the report, while still utilizing it within the government, was justified on the basis of certain classified data which it was said to contain. Portions of the study were subsequently made public in June, 1966, during hearings of the House Armed Services Committee.¹⁹

Shortly after the Defense study was completed, President Johnson appointed a National Advisory Committee on Selective Service, chaired by Burke Marshall, a former Assistant Attorney General under President Kennedy. Not to be outdone, the House Armed Services Committee appointed its own group, the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, chaired by retired General Mark W. Clark. While making several recommendations for reform of the existing draft system, the groups both rejected the concept of an all-volunteer force as unworkable and impractical.²⁰ Nevertheless, proponents of the All Volunteer concept were not satisfied with the thoroughness displayed on this point by either group. Donald Rumsfeld, then a young Congressman from Illinois, complained in his testimony that the Marshall Commission dismissed "the possibility of moving to volunteerism in two pages of loose argument, backed by two graphs," while the Clark

Panel disposed "of a volunteer army in one paragraph, without even one graph."²¹ Despite the public hue and cry, the consensus of the Administration and the Congress was that the draft had to be extended to insure that the military manpower needs of the country would be met. Not surprisingly, the final form of the new draft law contained some modifications, but generally extended the existing draft system until 30 June 1971.²²

While the above discussion is far from complete in many respects, three significant points appear to stand out in analyzing the draft debate of the late 1960's.

First, conscription during peacetime was, if not fervently endorsed, at least tolerated by the American public for almost twenty years. Not until opposition to the Vietnam War began to deepen was the peacetime draft system subject to real criticism.

Second, public support for conscription will be withdrawn if the nation engages in an unpopular war. The relative justice of a particular system of conscription notwithstanding, it will be repudiated if public support for the war is absent.

Third, procedural complexity ostensibly created for the purpose of incorporating greater justice into the system will, in fact, promote the opposite. A straightforward system based on sound philosophical principles would have been superior to the system we inherited in 1965.

THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE EMERGES

While debate over the war and the draft continued to rage, the remainder of the Johnson term saw no new initiatives of any significance in the area of Selective Service reform. The draft had become a

political issue, however, and 1968 was a presidential election year. The problem of compulsory military service seemed an attractive campaign issue to Richard Nixon and, on 17 October 1968, he made public his views. "I say it's time we took a new look at the draft -- at the question of permanent conscription in a free society. If we find we can reasonably meet our peacetime manpower needs by other means -- then we should prepare for the day when the draft can be phased out of American life."²³

Soon after assuming the Presidency, Mr. Nixon initiated action to implement his campaign promise. On 27 March 1969, he announced the appointment of an Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. The charter of this group, which quickly became known as the Gates Commission, differed significantly in at least one respect from those provided earlier blue-ribbon panels. The President's announcement stated, "I have directed the Commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer force." It also stated that the Commission would "give serious consideration to our requirements for an adequate reserve forces program"²⁴ The thrust of the new Commission was clear; feasibility of an all-volunteer force was no longer at issue. The principal task of the Commission was to prove convincingly that it could in fact be done, and then devise a program for achieving it.

While it would take the Gates Commission eleven months to compile its report, the Administration program was launched immediately. In April the Department of Defense established the Project Volunteer Committee, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and

Reserve Affairs), to plan for the transition to an All Volunteer Force.²⁵

In November the President signed into law a widely-heralded bill which significantly revised Selective Service procedures. Draft vulnerability was reduced from seven years to one, and a lottery system established for determining the order of induction of those eligible during the following calendar year.²⁶ A month earlier the President had announced that General Hershey, then age 76 and Selective Service Director since 1941, would be replaced the following February. Hershey had become a major target of the anti-draft forces, but had experienced a steady erosion of support in the Department of Defense as well. A replacement was difficult to find. Finally, Curtis W. Tarr, an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, was appointed and confirmed.²⁷

On 20 February 1970 the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force submitted its long-awaited report. Not surprisingly, in view of their original charter, they unanimously agreed that the nation's interests would better be served by an all-volunteer force. Furthermore, they felt that an all-volunteer force of between two and three million could be sustained if the Commission's other major recommendations were implemented. These included a substantial pay increase for lower-ranking enlisted men and junior officers. In addition, it recommended "comprehensive improvements in conditions of military service and in recruiting." Finally, it strongly recommended that a standby draft system be retained.²⁸

The Gates Commission felt that if its recommendations were adopted, the transition to the All Volunteer Force (AVF) could be accomplished by 30 June 1971. The Nixon Administration took a more realistic view, however, and established 30 June 1973 as the latest

date for termination of the draft. Otherwise, it accepted all the Commission's findings and initiated the actions required to make the All Volunteer Force a reality.²⁹ Extension of the draft beyond its 30 June 1971 termination date required Congressional authorization. Debate over the measure was fueled by speculation on the recommendations of the Gates Commission and the prospects for an All Volunteer Force. The expiration date passed and inductions ceased for almost three months while Congress conducted hearings and debated the issues. Finally, Congress agreed with the President and granted an extension until 30 June 1973.³⁰

While the All Volunteer Force was being debated in government and academic circles, the Department of Defense continued planning for the transition to it. The Army, in particular, was critical to the success of the volunteer concept. Its Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, proceeded resolutely to get the Army in step with the new program. In October, 1970, he announced implementation of the Modern Volunteer Army concept and the following month devoted the majority of his annual commanders' conference to laying out its framework. The Modern Volunteer Army (MVA or VOLAR) program was instituted to provide a transition vehicle for moving the Army from 30 years of reliance on the draft to a 100% volunteer force. It was recognized early that this would not be an easy task, and that some fundamental adjustments were necessary if sufficient volunteers were to be attracted.³¹ The stated objectives of the VOLAR program were to increase service attractiveness; improve the professionalism of the Army; and enhance its somewhat tarnished public image. The program was both comprehensive and complex, requiring a reassessment of the traditional

military self-image, as well as some modification of standards and policies. In particular, the prospect of having to personally recruit the manpower for the All Volunteer Force, without having the draft to fall back on, was a cause for concern. What relative success the U. S. Army Recruiting Command enjoyed during the Vietnam conflict was owed primarily to the impetus of the draft driving potential inductees to seek a more attractive occupational field than light weapons infantryman. Its success in meeting Total Force manpower needs in the zero-draft environment will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Generally speaking, however, the VOLAR program succeeded in easing the transition to an All Volunteer Force, improving internal conditions in the Army, and recruiting sufficient numbers to keep the ranks filled. The final draft call under the existing authorization was made in December, 1972, and on 1 July 1973 the nation formally entered the all-volunteer era.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Like most other institutions, the All Volunteer Force can best be characterized as an evolutionary product rather than an abstract creation. In analyzing the forces which shaped the AVF, it is particularly interesting to note the influence of public opinion. Upon close examination, the great public debate which revolved around the draft was largely irrelevant given the specific circumstances at that time. The remedies proposed, in particular an all-volunteer military, were clearly inadequate to meet the manpower requirements of the undeclared war in Southeast Asia. In retrospect, it might properly be asked why public discussion had focused on essentially philosophical

issues while ignoring practical reality. Rather than offering cogent solutions to the draft's inequities, critics cited these inequities as justification for fundamental change. In truth, the underlying issue had always been opposition to the war. Critics hoped that by discrediting the Selective Service, they could render it ineffective as a means of enforcing public participation in the Vietnam War. Only if the draft ceased to function could they be sure of achieving their goal of a complete American withdrawal.

Although the Administration avoided linking its All Volunteer Force initiatives to the Vietnam War, the decision to scrap the draft was consistent with the new role President Nixon envisioned for the United States in world affairs. Generically referred to as the Nixon Doctrine, this included "Vietnamization" of the war in Southeast Asia and gradual withdrawal of U. S. forces from combat. American ground involvement had been declining since mid-1969, and with a peace settlement imminent, total withdrawal of the remaining troops was likely.³² Adoption of the All Volunteer Force concept was to be timed to generally coincide with termination of the troop commitment to South Vietnam. Recognizing that he had no practical alternative, President Nixon had effectively silenced critics first by ending U. S. participation in the war, and then by adopting the AVF concept.

The result of an evolutionary process accelerated by the nation's unhappy experience in Vietnam, the All Volunteer Force is today a vital element of our national security strategy. A reduced force structure, built around a relatively small, all-volunteer active force and supplemented by the reserves would serve as the foundation of conventional national defense. In August, 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird

summarized his conviction in the inherent superiority of a volunteer force in his report to the President and the Congress on progress in ending the draft.

1. In a peacetime environment, the Armed Forces will function best in a free environment where they compete with others for people.
2. An organization composed of volunteers, having survived the test of free competition, tends to be more efficient than one that relies on forced entry.
3. The alleged pitfalls of the voluntary military organization -- that it will be dominated by mercenaries, who will take over our nation, or be all black -- are false and unfounded claims.³³

The concept of a volunteer Army was a radical departure from post-World War II national policy, and has generated skepticism on both the philosophical and practical levels. Some were suspicious of the motives behind it.

If the movement for a volunteer Army had been launched from a genuine desire to devise a more effective or a more equitable military manpower policy for the United States, it would be far more impressive. But the message is quite clear. It arises solely from the belief of many of our college students that military service is distasteful and should be left to those who have nothing better to do.³⁴

While the disadvantages of an All Volunteer Force were usually acknowledged, others felt that its creation was the result of more dynamic, evolutionary influences found in American society.

The all-volunteer force can be thought of as one response to the economic and social pressures operating in the United States, which are not unique but more or less common to advanced industrialized societies of the NATO nations. These pressures reflect the effort to limit military budgets - that is, to keep them under a fixed percentage of the gross national budget and hopefully to allow them to decline in order to release resources for domestic programmes. Moreover, elements of the new style of civilian life - leisure and relative affluence - find their way into the military establishment. Although it continues to retain some of its traditions, protocol and heroic features, the military becomes one profession among many and one which, because of its functions and internal organization, faces particularly special problems of manpower

recruitment and retention.³⁵

Its antecedents having been established, a meaningful analysis of the All Volunteer Force's present status will be possible. If the Reserve Components, ostensibly equal partners under the Total Force policy, appear to have been overlooked in the preceding discussions, it is only an accurate reflection of the weight such considerations have traditionally carried in the councils of the decisionmakers. Reserve Component policy at the national level has normally been the neglected stepchild of Department of Defense manpower planning, and the creation of the AVF was no exception. Understandably, active force considerations have driven the system. Whether the nation can afford further reserve force neglect, however, is becoming an increasingly important question.

Chapter 2

FOOTNOTES

¹ William H. McNeill, "The Draft in the Light of History," The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 118-19.

² Harry A. Marmion, "Historical Background of Selective Service in the United States," Selective Service and American Society, ed. Roger W. Little (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), pp. 36-37.

³ Ibid., pp. 38-39.

⁴ President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, Report, February 20, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 164.

⁵ James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970 (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1971), p. 6.

⁶ President's Commission, op. cit., p. 164.

⁷ Gerhardt, op. cit., pp. 3-4. ⁸ Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 83-88. ¹⁰ Little, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

¹¹ President's Commission, op. cit., p. 165.

¹² Ibid., pp. 165-66.

¹³ Jean Carper, Bitter Greetings: The Scandal of the Military Draft (New York: Grossman, 1967), pp. 15-16.

¹⁴ Michael T. Klare, "Can the Army Survive VOLAR?", Commonweal, XCIX, 15 (January 18, 1974), 384-85.

¹⁵ Morris Janowitz, The U. S. Forces and the Zero Draft, Adelphi Papers, No. 72 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, January, 1970), pp. 4-5.

¹⁶ Carper, op. cit., pp. 81-89.

¹⁷ George E. Reedy, Who Will Do Our Fighting For Us? (New York: World Publishing Company, 1969), p. 115.

¹⁸Tax, op. cit., p. 466 ¹⁹Gerhardt, op. cit., pp. 286-87.

²⁰Harry A. Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer Army (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 29-30.

²¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Amending and Extending the Draft Law and Related Authorities, Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., April 12-19, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 431.

²²Gerhardt, op. cit., p. 337.

²³U.S., Department of Defense, Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, August, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.

²⁴President's Commission, op. cit., p. vii.

²⁵U.S., Department of Defense, Progress, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁶Ibid., p. 3. ²⁷Gerhardt, op. cit., p. 345.

²⁸President's Commission, op. cit., pp. 5-10.

²⁹U.S., Department of Defense, Progress, op. cit., p. 6.

³⁰Ibid., p. 7. ³¹Klare, op. cit., p. 386.

³²Ibid.

³³U.S., Department of Defense, Progress, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

³⁴Reedy, op. cit., p. 115. ³⁵Janowitz, op. cit., p. 5.

Chapter 3

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT MANPOWER POLICY

THE MANPOWER POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Ideally, military manpower policy is developed in an orderly, rational manner. The perceived threat to national security is analyzed and evaluated, and various courses of action are proposed to neutralize the threat. After these proposed responses, or reactions, are themselves fully evaluated, the most appropriate is selected. The chosen response then serves as the foundation for development of a force structure capable of achieving the desired result. The required force structure can be further distilled into its two principal components: manpower and equipment. Needed equipment is provided from existing assets, or is produced by the nation's industrial and commercial infrastructure. Likewise, manpower needs are filled from forces in being, or provided by the nation from its available supply of qualified young men and women. Ultimately, the force structure required to support the optimum response is created, and the threat is neutralized or overcome.¹

Unfortunately, the above process is often little more than a theoretical model. Typically, the threat is vague, ambiguous or not fully perceived. Responses may be proposed which are inadequate, excessive or unduly influenced by political considerations. It is not

surprising then that decisionmakers are seldom able to reach a consensus as to the proper course of action to adopt, and some form of compromise usually results. In an advanced democracy such as the United States, the required force structure evolves from a complex, institutionalized process of conflict and accommodation. Moreover, this process is usually conducted as part of the budgetary cycle, where critical demands from every sector of society compete for limited national assets in the form of dollars. To the United States military, people are dollars. Burgeoning manpower costs now absorb well over half of the nation's annual defense budget. Additionally, the voluntary concept of military service has, in practical terms, reduced the pool of available manpower to a bare minimum.²

It is readily apparent from the above discussion that the force structure in a democracy can be, to a significant degree, determined by manpower and materiel constraints rather than the perceived threat. Resources are not unlimited; the desired response, lacking the requisite force structure for effective implementation gives way to the expedient response. The gap between the expedient response and the response necessary to insure security becomes an assumed risk. All forms of human endeavor entail some degree of risk, so it is perhaps natural that national security should, also. But when national security in a hostile world equates to national survival, it is imperative that risk be reduced to the lowest possible level.

Further analysis of the manpower policy development process and its implications is not germane to this study. However, an appreciation of the system is helpful in understanding the interdependence and practical limitations on force structure and response in meeting

a perceived threat.

NATIONAL STRATEGY AND ARMY DOCTRINE

The purpose of this study is to develop manpower options for the future, not to examine national strategy or evaluate current Army doctrine. However, the discussion in the preceding section has clearly established that manpower considerations do not exist in a vacuum, but are vital components of total national security policy. National strategy is largely the sum of the responses we believe are necessary to preserve our security. Army doctrine provides general guidelines for the employment of Army forces under response conditions. Both influence, and in turn are influenced by the manpower component of the force structure. If manpower policy is to have any validity it must support national strategies. On the other hand, Army doctrine must be justifiable in terms of national security strategy and manpower policy. No more than a bare outline of national strategy and current Army doctrine will be attempted here, and then only to provide relevancy to critical manpower issues.

In the coming months, national security strategy will probably be expressed by some new catchphrase, but in substance will change little from that of "realistic deterrence" as developed by former President Nixon. In February, 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird described the three pillars of this strategy: strength, partnership, and a willingness to negotiate. Founded on the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy for Peace, the "National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" sought "to deter war, but insure adequate capabilities to protect our nation and its interests should deterrence fail."³ While a firm

commitment was made to continued military strength, the Secretary made it clear that the future active force structure would be significantly reduced and no more than 7% of the GNP would be allocated to defense needs.⁴ Exclusive reliance on active U.S. forces, as had been the case during the Vietnam War, was to be replaced by the Total Force concept, and he repeated a statement made the previous year:

In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. These Free World military and related resources -- which we call "Total Force" -- include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.⁵

In August, 1973, Secretary Laird further articulated and upgraded this philosophy, and focused it primarily on U. S. forces. "Total Force is no longer a 'concept'. It is now the Total Force policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole."⁶ The general framework of American strategy in the 1970's having thus been erected, it remained for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the respective services to further define the threat, propose appropriate responses, and develop a supporting force structure. overshadowing this hopefully objective appraisal, however, were the very severe manpower and budgetary limitations explicitly imposed by the strategy of realistic deterrence.

The degree to which the Army was forced to develop responses and doctrine to fit available resources, rather than the threat, is irrelevant to our purposes. Struggling through the first difficult year of the zero-draft while trying to sever its emotional attachments to the Vietnam era and establish a new identity, the Army saw little

reason for excitement until the sudden, violent outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli War in October, 1973. The violence and destructiveness of this conflict, concentrated in the relatively brief span of 19 days, caught the attention of U.S. tacticians and planners. In the months which followed, intense study of the tactical lessons of the Yom Kippur War, as well as related strategic implications, led to development of what soon became known as the "Short War Strategy."⁷

What proportion of this new scenario is strategy, as opposed to tactical doctrine, is debatable. Regardless, the realities of the Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe and corresponding limitations on U.S. capabilities in that theater virtually dictated adoption of the "Short War Strategy" by NATO planners. Approximately 30 full strength Soviet divisions and 35 Warsaw Pact divisions, boasting heavy superiority in tanks and artillery are currently available for immediate employment against NATO forces.⁸ When fully developed, the short war scenario is not a pleasant one, as the former Chief of Staff of the Army noted.

The accuracy, effectiveness and mobility of modern weapons have magnified the lethality of the battlefield. Future conflicts will be furious, intense and deadly. The unready and unwilling will perish....The magnified lethality of the modern battlefield leads to another aspect of today's warfare: the crucial importance of the first battle. For the very reasons that clashes of armies will probably become more violent and deadly, armed encounters are also quite apt to be more decisive. ...The outcome of the next war could very well be determined by the outcome of the initial battles. The loser of the opening engagements may find that for him the fight is over. Victory or defeat quite possibly may rest squarely on the army-in-being. It must be a ready and capable force.⁹

In fact, strategic implications have amplified the importance of strong, flexible conventional forces. Former Secretary of the Army Callaway noted "the critical element of national power between

nuclear superpowers now lies in usable conventional force or the threat of such force. . . . There is dramatic evidence that the Soviets are determined to shift the strategic balance by building their conventional force.¹⁰ His successor as Army Secretary, Mr. Hoffman, advanced the same viewpoint, while underscoring Total Force readiness.

The only way war can be deterred or limited is through readiness of the Total Force - immediately usable active Army and reserve components forces. The need for readiness is particularly relevant in this era of nuclear weapon parity. By whatever it is called...the United States and the Soviet Union are currently locked in a nuclear stalemate....The potential destructiveness of nuclear exchange coupled with stalemate has paradoxically refocused attention upon conventional forces as the operative elements in the military balance.¹¹

All things considered, the "Short War Strategy" appears to be a credible response to the threat perceived in Western Europe. But its potential flaw lies in what it leaves unsaid. The first page of the revised Field Manual (FM) 100-5, the much-heralded capstone of Army tactical doctrine, is illustrative.

Because the lethality of modern weapons continues to increase sharply, we can expect very high losses to occur in short periods of time. Entire forces could be destroyed quickly if they are improperly employed. Therefore, the first battle of our next war could well be its last battle: belligerents could be quickly exhausted, and international pressures to stop fighting could bring about an early cessation of hostilities. The United States could find itself in a short, intense war - the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat.¹²

While this may be a satisfactory basis for Army tactical doctrine in the mid-intensity environment, it should not be accepted as the most likely strategic hypothesis. For example, the word "could" appears a total of five times in the above passage. No responsible strategist should be comfortable with that many assumptions. There is no guarantee that an aggressor would opt for early negotiations, regardless of his losses in a conventional "first battle," if he perceived that the

United States lacked the staying power for another round of combat. Nor is there any guarantee that the President would be in a position to authorize use of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the traditional fall-back option if NATO forces are unable to contain a conventional Soviet invasion. The possibilities of quick escalation to unacceptable levels of nuclear exchange could effectively eliminate this as a viable course of action. The Defense Manpower Commission, agreeing with the former Army Secretaries on the value of conventional forces, expressed a similar concern after reviewing the short war scenario.

In the nuclear era, much of our strategic planning has centered on defense against fairly sudden, violent outbreaks of war, hopefully with some warning, but with little regard to extended periods of mobilization. Additionally, serious consideration is being given to the "short war" concept based on the hope that negotiations could begin before nuclear weapons are used. This reasoning, together with a faith in strategic deterrence and a feeling of futility in contemplating a nuclear holocaust, has caused the United States to neglect important aspects of mobilization planning, including industrial resources. Nuclear parity, or a state of mutual strategic deterrence, does not deter lesser levels of intensity; rather it creates a situation where conventional forces become the relevant element of military action.¹³

In the preceding analysis, the Commission has touched upon a subtle, yet crucial contradiction between the short war strategy and the Total Force policy. Simply stated, what is the role of the reserves if we anticipate the war will be over before they can be mobilized? Despite the rhetoric in support of strong Reserve Components, our failure to develop a coherent doctrinal synthesis of the short war scenario and the Total Force policy undermines all our efforts to upgrade the reserves.

While failing to resolve the doctrinal dilemma, the foregoing

outline of current strategy and doctrine provides the imperative rationale for the Reserve Components under the Total Force policy. The foundation of this policy is augmentation of a reduced active force structure by stronger, better prepared Reserve Components during any future conflict. This view has been consistently supported by both civilian leaders and military chiefs over the past several years. Considering the potential threat posed by growing Soviet conventional power, there is no alternative to Total Force readiness. Inability of the Reserve Components to reach and maintain readiness levels prescribed by Department of Defense mobilization and deployment plans seriously undermines national security policy. Moreover, the deterrent value of the Total Force depreciates rapidly when reserve forces are experiencing constant manpower crises.

SUSTAINING THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

If we assume that both the active and the reserve components of the Total Force are vital to our national security, as responsible officials have consistently maintained, then a fully manned force structure is of the utmost concern. A review of our relative success in meeting manpower levels will underscore the necessity for exploring alternatives to the current system.

Within the Army, organizational responsibility for active duty recruiting and enlistment rests with the U. S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), headquartered at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. Catapulted into prominence by the advent of the All Volunteer Force, it has the unenviable mission of locating, processing and enlisting sufficient volunteers each week to sustain the active component. Once on active

duty, an enlistee's unit or organization assumes the responsibility for retaining qualified personnel beyond their initial period of service. Recruiting, supplemented by selective retention, is the sole source of enlisted manpower. Staff responsibility for both functions is exercised by the Department of the Army through its Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In the Reserve Components, the recruiting and retention functions are primarily the responsibility of the chain of command and individual units. Within certain prescribed limits, policy formulation and supervision are decentralized to the various responsible agencies. The reserves have no organization comparable to the Recruiting Command. Instead, the Office, Chief of the Army Reserve and the National Guard Bureau provide Department of the Army guidance to the major Army Reserve commands and state adjutants general, respectively. Recruiting remains essentially a command responsibility, however.


Termination of the draft during Fiscal Year 1973 found the Army's Recruiting Command ill-prepared for the monumental tasks it was about to undertake. Recruiting successfully in a zero-draft environment was a new experience, and considerable readjustment was necessary throughout the Army's personnel management system. Consequently, the transition year of FY 73 resulted in attainment of only 85.9% of the recruiting objective. This pattern continued throughout most of FY 74, but the economic repercussions of the Arab oil embargo sparked a year-end surge in enlistments which enabled the Army to meet its fiscal year end strength, as well as 100.3% of its enlistment objective. If the Army's goal in FY 74 was quantity, in FY 75 it changed to quantity and quality. The nation's economy remained in the doldrums

and year-end attainment was 100.8% of objective. Moreover, the percentage of mental category IV enlistees dropped from 20% to 11%, and the percentage of high school graduates increased significantly. Emboldened by its success, the Army fine-tuned its recruiting machine during FY 76. In August, 1975, a weekly objective system was introduced which, for the first time, tied all enlistments directly to training spaces and school vacancies available for a particular reception station week. As a result, Army-wide school seat utilization rose from 75% to 92%, while still attaining 100.2% of the total recruiting objective.¹⁴

Throughout the FY 74-76 period, the Army's recruiting market was characterized by high unemployment nationwide and the surprising dimension of the revolution in women's rights. The greatly expanded utilization of women enabled the Army to maintain high quality standards during FY 76, despite a noticeable decrease in male quality indicators.

The fiscal year transition quarter and the 1st Quarter, FY 77, showed a distinct drop in recruiting productivity. The quarterly attainment of 96.0% and 94.8% respectively, while far from a catastrophe, have caused some well-founded concern.¹⁵ Economic recovery has been gathering momentum and unemployment levels are dropping below recession norms. Overall unemployment hovered near the 8% level for two years while in the target population (ages 16-19) during the same period it averaged nearly 20%.¹⁶ Although optimistic that current trends can be reversed, the Army may soon be forced to relax existing quality restrictions in order to meet required strength levels. Table 3-1 depicts active duty recruiting attainment since FY 1973.

Table 3-1



While recruiting for the active Army could be termed a marginal success to date, the Reserve Components have experienced a serious strength deterioration over the last three years. In November, 1976, the National Guard Bureau announced that Army Guard strength had dropped to its lowest level in the all-volunteer era.¹⁸ In January, 1977, an interim Department of Defense report on reserve compensation noted that the Individual Ready Reserve was seriously depleted, and overall the reserves did not have enough personnel to do their job in a major mobilization.¹⁹ The following month, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs informed a Congressional subcommittee that the volunteer Army was a failure in the Reserve Components.²⁰ As of 31 October 1976, total strength of the USAR Selected Reserve was approximately 90.9% of authorized, while the ARNG Selected Reserve stood at 91.6% of its authorized strength of 400,000. Table 3-2 depicts beginning and ending Reserve Component strengths for the eighteen month period from May, 1975, to October, 1976. Enlisted strength in each

reserve category experienced a serious decline during this period, as reflected by the "Net Loss" entries.

Table 3-2

Reserve Component Strengths²¹
May 1975 - October 1976

	May 75	Oct 76	Net Loss
ARNG Selected Reserve			
Enlisted	361,697	332,539	29,158
Total	395,263	366,579	28,684
USAR Selected Reserve			
Enlisted	189,191	157,037	32,154
Total	227,411	192,787	34,624
USAR Indiv Ready Reserve			
Enlisted	323,689	159,041	164,648
Total	376,805	209,954	166,851
USAR Standby Reserve (Active)			
Enlisted	249,287	153,051	96,236
Total	267,478	160,802	106,676

As responsible officials begin to take note of the seriously depleted condition of the Reserve Components, it is appropriate to inquire into the causes of their deterioration. During the years of the Vietnam War the Reserve Components enjoyed an unmatched level of popularity. Demand so outstripped available openings that by the end of 1969 the Army National Guard had a waiting list of over 100,000 men and the Army Reserve a list of almost 50,000. Nevertheless, the reserves lost much of their prestige and self-esteem during the Vietnam conflict. Viewed by many as havens for upper-middle class draft dodgers and professional athletes seeking to avoid the hazards of combat, the reserves suffered a further loss of credibility as a result of President Johnson's steadfast refusal to order a general call to

active duty.²² Highly publicized protests from members of those few units which were called up added insult to injury.

As Vietnam manpower requirements spiraled downward, so did the waiting lists, until just two years later they were virtually exhausted.²³ Although generally able to maintain their strength levels as long as the draft was still in existence, the Reserve Components embarked on a long term decline in 1973 which has culminated in the current state of affairs. The causes are actually not very complex; draft motivated volunteers constituted such an overwhelming preponderance of first term accessions that the reserves were unable to compensate for their loss. The seriousness of the situation did not become obvious until large numbers of Vietnam era enlistees began to reach the end of their active reserve commitments. Strength of the Individual Ready Reserve eroded quickly due to a similar situation.²⁴ The volunteer Army, almost half the size of the wartime Army and based on three and four year active duty enlistments, could not produce near the IRR input necessary to replace the huge quantities of Vietnam War draftees who were reaching their sixth year of obligated service.

Estimates vary as to the percentage of Reserve Component accessions who were motivated to join solely by the prospects of induction. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force conceded that perhaps 75% of reserve enlisted personnel had joined because of the draft.²⁵ Other studies produced even higher estimates. The Research Analysis Corporation, in a comprehensive study of Reserve Component manpower issues, reported that "it appears that the pressure of the draft has been the motivating factor for some 86 percent of NPS (non-prior service) enlistees in ARNG/USAR. Caution must be exercised,

however, in the use of this fraction to project potential numbers of enlistees without the draft.²⁶ An independent survey, conducted by an Army Reserve officer attending the Command and General Staff College, generally confirmed the RAC findings. After random polling of reservists in seven widely separated states, he reported that 67% indicated that they had joined to avoid the draft, while an additional 23% selected the more socially acceptable response "to complete military obligation." Consequently, termination of the draft removed the principal enlistment motivator of 90% of the Reserve "volunteers" polled.²⁷

While termination of the draft was by far the most important cause of declining strengths, other factors also had an adverse effect on recruiting and retention. Attitude surveys disclosed that poor leadership, unimaginative training, appearance standards and low pay, to cite only a few examples, were degrading voluntary manpower programs.²⁸ Studies such as those cited in the preceding paragraph sought to isolate negative motivators and develop positive programs for attracting volunteers. Since draft-related inducements would no longer be available, they concentrated on economic incentives, increased benefits, and elimination of unnecessary irritants. While the results of this and related research at least offered an alternative to inevitable crisis, both the Administration and the Congress have consistently failed to support and fund an adequate program of economic and monetary incentives.²⁹ Lacking an attractive package of benefits and inducements, the best efforts of the Department of the Army and the Reserve Components have been unable to avert an impending manpower crisis.

The present situation is the result of a policy of benign neglect, over a period of many years, on the part of both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. The practice of avoiding induction by enlisting in the Reserve Components was condoned long before Vietnam. During the war, continued abuse of the system lowered respect for the Reserve Components, compounding the loss of credibility which resulted when they were not called up. Opportunities to propose and develop a coherent reserve policy have been ignored. The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service devoted one and a half pages of its report to the Reserve Components. The Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement limited itself to only two recommendations on the reserves, one of which was relatively insignificant. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force devoted a chapter to the reserves, but its treatment was basically superficial. Moreover, it failed to adequately address the future viability of the Reserve Components in a zero-draft environment. The Defense Manpower Commission did conduct an in-depth probe into reserve policies, but to date little action has been taken on its recommendations. In addition, a myriad of surveys, research studies and governmental reports have documented the plight of the Army's Reserve Components. But still we are left with outdated policies and programs.

In January, 1973, Morris Janowitz observed that "the United States Congress has not debated the emerging functions of the military, or the basic problems of creating an all-volunteer force."³⁰ That assessment, applicable to the general public as well, has remained accurate until recent months. Shortly after assuming office, President

Carter ordered a major review of the Reserve Components. In January, 1977, Senator Howard Baker speculated on national television that perhaps this should be the year for a great national debate on the all-volunteer concept.. Prominent editorials have discussed a possible return to the draft, and a growing awareness of our manpower deficiencies is apparent. The concept of universal national service is even receiving serious consideration. We can only hope that a positive coherent national policy will result.

Chapter 3

FOOTNOTES

¹ Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security, April, 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 40.

² Ibid., pp. 76-87.

³ U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973, February, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

⁶ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 98.

⁷ James H. Polk, "The New Short War Strategy," Strategic Review, III (Summer, 1975), 52-53.

⁸ The Military Balance 1975-1976, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 8-14.

⁹ Fred C. Weyand, "Our Strategy is Readiness," Army, October, 1975, p. 16.

¹⁰ Howard H. Callaway, "The Army and the Future," Strategic Review, III (Fall, 1975), 14.

¹¹ Martin R. Hoffman, "Taking Stock of the Army at Nation's Bicentennial," Army, October, 1976, pp. 8-9.

¹² U.S., Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 1-1.

¹³ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁴ U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Recruiting Management Directorate, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, February, 1977.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Bring Back the Draft?", U.S. News and World Report, LXXXII, 6 (February 14, 1977), pp. 55-56. See also Department of Labor monthly unemployment statistics.

¹⁷ U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Recruiting Management Directorate, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, February, 1977.

¹⁸ "NG Strength Lowest Since June '73," Army Times, November 29, 1976.

¹⁹ "Reserves Strength Too Low," Army Times, January 17, 1977, p. 10.

²⁰ "More Recruiting Cash Asked for Reserves," Army Times, February 21, 1977, p. 16.

²¹ U.S., Department of Defense, Guard and Reserve Manpower: Strengths and Statistics, 31 October 1976 (Washington: Department of Defense, 1976), pp. 1, 2, 4.

²² Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 4-7.

²³ William L. Clement, and others, "Maintenance of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment," (New York: Research Analysis Corporation, 1972), Vol. I, p. 2-11.

²⁴ Andy Plattner, "Draft Issue Surfaces on Capitol Hill," Army Times, February 28, 1977, p. 8.

²⁵ President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Report, February 20, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 97.

²⁶ Clement, op. cit., p. 2-14.

²⁷ Moss M. Ikeda, "Reserve Strength in Face of Zero Draft," Military Review, LIII, 5 (May, 1973), 59-60. See also Ikeda, "Retention of First-Term Reserve Enlistment Personnel in the United States Army Reserve," (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1972), pp. 36-39.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 60-63.

²⁹ "OMB Swings Ax at USAR," Army Times, December 27, 1976, p. 3.

³⁰ Morris Janowitz, The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft, Adelphi Papers, No. 94 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 6.

Chapter 4

DEFENSE MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION


The preceding chapters have sought, in a general fashion, to outline the historical foundations of current defense manpower policies, and to analyze the implications and manifestations of these policies. As a minimum, it should have become evident that the present All Volunteer Force was to a substantial degree the child of necessity; that the present AVF could fall short of meeting the security needs of the nation; and that the capacity of the nation to provide sufficient manpower indefinitely through a voluntary system is questionable. A more detailed and comprehensive evaluation, particularly of the final two points, is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, these topics have been and continue to be the subjects of intense scrutiny within the responsible branches of government and in the public at-large. While opinion on the seriousness of the present situation is diverse, it is sufficient for our purposes to acknowledge that there are indications that the AVF, as presently structured may not be able to support critical national security objectives in the future. Thus a review of possible defense manpower alternatives is prudent and worthwhile. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the specific alternatives which are available.

In order to insure that all reasonable options are identified, as well as to facilitate further study and analysis, a simple model of the manpower system is a useful tool for developing alternatives. This model will be presented in subsequent paragraphs. Before turning to it, however, one should be aware that not every conceivable alternative will be proposed. Those manpower alternatives so unconventional as to make their likelihood of adoption impossible or highly improbable will not be discussed. In addition, some of the alternatives proposed will relate primarily to active component manpower policies, others will be directed solely to the manning of the Reserve Components. The reason for this is obvious and logical: the military forces of the United States are truly a Total Force. The close interrelation of all aspects of the active and reserve forces should profoundly influence any future manpower initiatives designed for either component. Therefore, it is both desirable and unavoidable that national manpower policies be viewed in the context of the Total Force.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL

Inherent in any model is the risk of oversimplification, and the one described below may well be an example. Yet, the further we are able to reduce complex systems into their most basic ingredients, the more likely that our solutions will be valid and useful. The model employed here distills the defense manpower system into three basic elements: two are quantifiable, physical variables, the third a process variable operating between the first two. This model is depicted graphically at Figure 4-1. The first variable is the national manpower pool. The quantitative size of the manpower pool is essentially a

Figure 4-1
Simplified Defense Manpower Model



function of qualitative definition, constrained at the upper limit by the total population subject to the system. The other quantitative variable is the sum of defense manpower requirements. This figure will include all uniformed military personnel required by the Total Force to support national security objectives. It is readily apparent that the magnitude of these dynamic variables is greatly influenced by political, societal and economic pressures. The final element is the process variable by which individuals are transferred from the general manpower pool to fill a specific manpower space in the Total Force. From a practical standpoint, this procedural variable exists in only two forms. One is the process presently used to fill the ranks of the AVF: this could be termed the "voluntary" system, since participation is not mandatory. The other form is the "voluntary/involuntary" system, which is best exemplified by the draft system of the United States from World War II to the inception of the AVF. This form combines the involuntary aspects of conscription with voluntary entry into the uniformed services. In the United States, voluntary entry options have traditionally been a significant feature of any program of compulsory service. A third variant, a totally "involuntary" system, is conceivable, but so unlikely that it will be discarded without further consideration.

Before the developmental model described above is activated, however, it is necessary to outline the role and limitations of each variable in process analysis and development of alternatives. Such a review will facilitate understanding of the manpower system and preclude duplication in subsequent explanations of options. In every instance the methodology for developing available options will produce a concrete management action reasonably available to the President, the Congress,

the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Army. Subjective alternatives such as changing the nature of the military or reshaping the attitude of the American public toward the military, while perhaps worthy of discussion in another forum, are outside the scope of this study. However, in those instances where the new policy or statutory alternatives proposed would entail broad societal implications, subjective issues may be selectively introduced in order to place the option in a usable practical perspective. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, consideration of options will be limited to those having some foundation in the contemporary American milieu.

What should and should not be expected from the developmental model, in view of the preceding delimitations, will become clear as each of the variables is discussed in greater detail. For example, alternatives will be developed from the manpower pool variable through the application and analysis of management options which would increase or decrease the magnitude of the available pool. Obviously, importing qualified aliens into the United States for purposes of military enlistment would expand the manpower pool; however, serious consideration of such an unconventional alternative is clearly pointless. The alternatives developed from the other quantitative variable, the Total Force element, will likewise focus on actions and decisions which increase or decrease the magnitude of defense manpower requirements. Reducing the size of the active forces is a viable alternative, but completely disbanding them and replacing them with militia-type forces is probably not a reasonable option under a policy of "prudent risk." The third variable, the procedural mechanism used to procure military manpower, will also be employed to develop alternatives. Options will be

developed from this variable in both its "voluntary" and "involuntary" (mixed voluntary/involuntary) modes. Finally, hybrid alternatives developed by the interaction of two or more system variables will only be introduced on a selective basis, due to the virtually unlimited permutations which could occur. Chapter 6, Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations, will offer for consideration one set of alternatives for dealing with the impending manpower crisis.

Having thus articulated the expectations and delimitations of the methodology described above, the development of specific alternatives can commence. Again, it is necessary to point out that the complexity of the issues raised will, in most instances, permit only a brief and preliminary treatment of each of the some nineteen alternatives proposed below. Footnote references and the bibliography will introduce the reader to a small part of the vast research opinion in this field. Moreover, many of these alternatives are presently being implemented, studied or debated in varying degrees by Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the academic community. Hopefully, the identification of alternatives and the limited analysis of each which follows will provide a logical, if rudimentary foundation for the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1. In order to facilitate classification and understanding of options, Figure 4-2 (following page) outlines the specific alternatives generated from each variable.

AVAILABLE OPTIONS

Reduction of the Total Force

Options under this general grouping will focus on the Total Force variable of the defense manpower model. Since insufficient

Figure 4-2

**Summary of Alternatives
By General Grouping**

Reduction of the Total Force

Reduce the size of the active forces

Reduce the size of the Reserve Components

Increase size of active forces; reduce size of Reserve Components

Reduce size of active forces; increase size of Reserve Components

Increase civilianization of noncombatant spaces

Expansion of the Manpower Pool

Open more job fields to women

Expand prior service recruiting programs

Lower enlistment standards

Abandon policy of geographic representation

Enhancement of Voluntary Programs

Continue present programs and policies

Increase enlistment incentives for the active Army

Increase enlistment incentives for the Reserve Components

Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recruiting forces

Improve and expand retention programs

Introduction of Involuntary Programs

Expand the reserve obligation and include women

Reinstitute the draft for the active Army

Institute a draft only for the Reserve Components

Offer military service as an option in a National Service Program

manpower is the principal factor influencing this variable, each of the five alternatives offered will presuppose a net reduction in the magnitude of the uniformed defense establishment, to be reflected either in the active or the Reserve Components, or both. It is obvious that a smaller structure will require less manpower. If such reductions are feasible, then a manpower crisis can be avoided without resort to more drastic remedies.

Reduce the size of the active forces. This alternative is frequently cited by critics of government spending in general, and of the defense establishment in particular. The alternatives in the force reduction grouping are some of the most difficult to evaluate empirically. This is a consequence of the almost incomprehensible complexity of the defense establishment and the international strategic environment in which it operates. Moreover, an individual's perceptions of it are greatly influenced by personal philosophical values and biases. Precise answers to the question of how much of what is necessary for minimal national security will never be agreed upon. Nevertheless, human beings must continually deal with this problem and reach conclusions as best they can under the circumstances. We cannot hope to shed new light here on this vast undertaking, which consumes the full-time attention of thousands of experts and decisionmakers. Instead, we must rely on the judgment of those who are the wisest and most experienced in the field.

There is no paucity of opinion on the subject of reducing active forces, as evidenced by the conflicting views of two United States senators prominent in national security affairs. Senator William

Proxmire, representing one school of thought, makes the valid point that we can and should reduce certain military forces. Citing waste of money and manpower in the defense establishment, his general argument that some reduction could be accomplished without detracting from overall national security is difficult to refute.¹ Less easy to achieve, however, would be a consensus among responsible officials of what could be eliminated and with what impact on defense capabilities. Senator Sam Nunn presents a contradictory viewpoint in equally persuasive terms, pointing out that we have experienced a 40% reduction in force levels since the Vietnam peak and cannot continue to cut force levels indefinitely.² Not surprisingly, opinion within the defense establishment is generally consistent with Senator Nunn's position. These officials have the primary responsibility for proposing a force structure to support national security objectives, and are able to back up their arguments with solid evidence. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger acknowledged the problem in the following terms:

While the basic justification for the general purpose forces is generally understood and accepted, it is more difficult to determine the size, composition, and deployment of these forces. This is regrettable but hardly surprising, for the process of establishing requirements (both quantitative and qualitative) does not lend itself to the simple mathematics of the strategic nuclear exchange.³

After expanding on the strategic considerations pertaining to this difficulty he summed up his personal views in four concise comments.

My own view is that:

- The general purpose forces will continue to grow in importance as nuclear parity continues.
- We have a minimum of these forces considering the extent of our interests and responsibilities and the capabilities of potential opponents.
- To reduce the force structure further would undermine the stability that comes from a basic equilibrium, and would lower

the chances for a more enduring peace.

-- We are, however, reassessing the types of forces we have and, in particular, the size and contribution of the support structure, to see whether adjustments can produce a more effective overall force balance with greater combat capability.⁴

It should be noted that by adding the fourth point, the Secretary took cognizance of the arguments of responsible defense critics.

The authorized strength of the active Army currently approaches 790,000. Most defense planners consider this well under the optimum "baseline" force level. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer an active force level of 972,000, the 1964 pre-Vietnam level.⁵ While this higher figure is probably unrealistic in the AVF era, it underscores the minimal adequacy of the Army's present force structure. In reviewing the 790,000-man force, The Defense Manpower Commission observed that "the Department of Defense has made a very strong case for the strengthened combatant force structures which it has advocated. Considering the current instability of the international situation, the requested force levels would seem to be the minimum currently necessary and may prove to be inadequate."⁶ The conclusion just presented appears to be a sound assessment of the active force level question. While austerity will remain the watchword and specific force elements will have to justify fully their continued existence, any substantial reduction in active Army forces would be imprudent at this time, given the threat and the current strategic environment.

Reduce the size of the Reserve Components. Fortunately, most of the fundamental manpower issues generated by proposed reductions in the structure of the Total Force have already been raised in the

preceding discussion, and henceforth need only be alluded to when appropriate. Reducing the size of the Reserve Components is certainly one logical alternative when faced with chronic personnel shortfalls, and it has received some serious consideration, primarily within the defense establishment. In fact, criticism of the existing reserve force structure is probably more justifiable than that leveled at the active forces. The difficulties of creating an ideal force structure are seriously compounded by the organizational diversity of the Reserve Components and the viscidities of defense management policies. While it appears that some corrective adjustments are required, the main question once again centers on magnitude. When explaining a policy decision, former Secretary Schlesinger outlined the basic Department of Defense approach to Reserve Component reductions when he stated "that some cuts should be taken in those units that are only marginally effective, with the savings that result to be applied to increasing the capability of other Reserve Component units."⁷ When the results of the "Total Force Study" were published, one item of DoD guidance charged the Army to "identify in its FY 77-81 program total active and/or reserve reductions of 40,000 structure spaces. Replacement structure may be formed to increase combat capability in Europe early in a NATO conflict."⁸ Thus, when faced with an apparent surplus of manpower spaces the Defense Department once again opted for selective reallocation rather than elimination. After reviewing the force structures of the Selected Reserve, the Defense Manpower Commission concurred in this type of reorganization. "While the Selected Reserves of the respective Services should continue at current personnel strength levels, some changes should be made in force composition to eliminate unnecessary

units and convert their manpower spaces to elements for which there is a genuine requirement in the event of mobilization.⁹ It is surprising that the force structure of the Reserve Components receives so little public scrutiny compared to the active forces. Perhaps the reserve structure is too elusive a target or critics may perceive, correctly or otherwise, that reserve forces are far cheaper than active forces and therefore a national security bargain under any circumstances.

One other aspect of this alternative should be mentioned before turning to other options. In a comprehensive and penetrating Special Report released shortly before the completion of this study, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) took note of the implications of the short war strategy for the Reserve Components.

It is not inconceivable that cost-reducers and proponents of the short war philosophy might assert that there is no need to sink more money in forces that may never be mobilized and fielded in time to influence the outcome of the short and violent next war. If so, it would not be the first time that costly programs had been made manageable by lowering requirements.¹⁰

Noting the potential impact of this argument on efforts to provide the Reserve Components a worthwhile incentives package, the AUSA report then rejected it on the basis that "the nature and duration of future warfare are sufficiently uncertain and unpredictable to justify forces that are versatile and strong enough to cope with a broad range of possibilities."¹¹ Time constraints precluded full use of this excellent report, but its findings closely parallel research presented in this study and it reaches many of the same conclusions.

One further alternative is a simultaneous reduction of both the active forces and the Reserve Components. While some anti-defense zealots might support this option, its rationale would be no stronger

than that proposed separately for each of the first two alternatives. Consequently, further consideration appears unprofitable.

Increase size of active forces; reduce size of Reserve Components. This alternative reflects a compromise of sorts between the conflicting views of strong national defense advocates and those who feel that the present force structure is already too large and wasteful. Again, this is an option which has received scant attention in the AVF debate. This is unfortunate, since it possesses a number of inherent strengths, as well as a few severe limitations.

Each year since the inception of the AVF the national defense leadership has defended the present force structure as the absolute minimum which could meet our security requirements without assuming unacceptable risk. For example, the JCS has gone on record as favoring a 32-division force over the present 24. A larger proportion would be in the active forces, thereby resulting in substantial risk reduction.¹² This rationale was also articulated by the Defense Manpower Commission: "Security requirements could best be met with active forces if the Nation's resources were unlimited. Because this is not the case, the mix of higher-cost active forces and lower-cost Reserve Forces is a realistic alternative, assuming U. S. security requirements are not drastically altered."¹³ The crucial issue here becomes whether or not the reserve forces are actually capable of meeting all of the security requirements upon which their existence is predicated. While certainly less expensive than active forces, some \$5.5 billion are spent annually on the reserves. As one analyst noted recently, "while granting that Reserve infantry battalions cost only

21% of an active duty battalion, if the unit cannot deploy in time it represents dollar waste, not savings."¹⁴ This question, like all which deal with the size and mix of the defense establishment, is highly complex. Nonetheless, it is an area which deserves serious consideration from manpower planners. A few of the inherent advantages are assured security, improved combat capability and readiness, minimal increase in total costs, and increased deterrent value. The most serious constraint on this alternative appears to be manpower availability in an all-volunteer environment. Long-range direct and indirect personnel costs could also render it an unacceptable option.

Reduce size of active forces; increase size of Reserve Components. Also a compound alternative, this option is basically the reverse of the one just presented. Since it incorporates a reduction of active forces, however, it has received more popular attention. Resorting to this alternative would entail a reduction in active forces and a commensurate increase in the size and capabilities of the Reserve Components. This is a particularly attractive option to observers outside the defense establishment, who argue that if the active forces cannot sustain themselves in the AVF era, then reduction to a force level which can be supported by volunteers is logical. Augmenting the Reserve Components, they feel, would insure against a degradation of defense capabilities. Spokesmen for a strong national defense are quick to attack these arguments, however. In a recent question-and-answer session retired General Maxwell D. Taylor responded as follows:

Q: The national press has reported a White House proposal to cut 10,000 active-duty troops and to use affiliated Reserve and National Guard brigades to replace them in contingencies. What impact would this have on the Army?

A: Reserve forces cannot compensate for the elimination of combat-ready soldiers. By their nature, as part-time soldiers, they can never match the readiness of regular forces. So if we are concerned about having a quick military-reaction capability we can't do it by replacing regulars with reservists.¹⁵

Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had articulated the same point of view in 1974.

The economies of the Guard and Reserve in relation to the cost of like active force units are real economies only to the extent that the Guard and Reserve can produce levels of readiness commensurate with Total Force needs and can respond within a timeframe which makes their contributions meaningful.¹⁶

Other analysts holding similar views have called attention to the present active force structure in arguing that substitution of reserves for active forces has already proceeded about as far as good judgment would allow. Nine of the eleven active Army divisions based in the United States rely upon one or more Reserve Component "roundout" battalions to bring themselves up to full authorized strength. Moreover, four of these divisions require at least one additional brigade from the reserves to meet their deployment levels.¹⁷ While the Army's reserve affiliation program has helped to bring these units up to higher readiness standards, their reliability in a short notice deployment is obviously lower than that of active forces.

Despite the short-term attractiveness of this option, which is not likely to diminish in the near future, one other implication should be considered. Simply transferring active spaces to the Reserve Components will not guarantee that they will be filled. At a time when reserve manpower is facing a crisis, such a transfer might simply equate to a net reduction of United States military capabilities. It is possible that lower readiness levels would be more easily tolerated or overlooked in the Reserve Components. Overall, this alternative

appears to offer little more than temporary relief while degrading military responsiveness.

Increase civilianization of non-combatant spaces. Civilianization of military spaces has been effectively underway since World War II, and perhaps longer. This alternative would expand the process even farther and accelerate the pace. In essence, it bears a strong resemblance to the preceding option, in that it reduces the overall active duty requirements of the military services through a process of substitution. But this course of action can apply to the reserves as well as the active forces, since substitutes are civilian employees. Consequently, this alternative shares several inherent drawbacks with the previous option. In addition, civilian employees are not deployable in the event of a conflict or contingency mission. The Defense Manpower Commission summarized federal civilian manpower as follows.

Civil Service manpower is less costly than military, primarily because less Federal structure has to be established in support of civilians (e.g., training, subsistence, and other personnel support.) Obviously civilians are not trained to be military professionals, especially in the combat arms. In the support areas, however, civilians should be considered for given jobs if the cost savings are significant.¹⁸

The Commission's broad statement of philosophy has been reflected in the widespread growth of the civilian component of the Total Force. Former Secretary Schlesinger defined the practical limits of civilianization, however, while establishing DoD's objectives. "The more obvious constraints on how far we can proceed in this direction are the effect on combat capability and on the military rotation base. Our present intentions are to push civilianization as far as we possibly can within the limitations of the above constraints."¹⁹

Civilianization is not limited to forces in the United States; in fact, it has proven invaluable in most overseas commands. Nevertheless, its limitations as a manpower alternative are both obvious and severe. The process should continue as outlined by DoD, but as a potential remedy for substantial military manpower shortfalls its impact will be slight.

Expansion of the Manpower Pool

Four alternatives will be proposed under this general grouping. Each option will be designed to increase the relative manpower pool from which the military services must draw their personnel. This is the other quantitative variable of the defense manpower model. There are several structural factors which limit the size of the pool. At the upper limit, the total population of the United States could be considered a maximum. The most critical delimiter is the age distribution of this population. Obviously, infants and the aged are not suitable for military purposes, although a review of mankind's history tends to blur such distinctions. Next there are certain categories of institutionalized and handicapped persons who are also not considered suitable for the military. Beyond these few basic constraints, eligibility for service is defined essentially by the cultural and social norms of the sustaining society. As will be noted, these norms do change.

Before examining specific alternatives, it would be useful to point out a population dynamic which will, in the near future, mitigate against the stated purpose of this section, namely expansion of the available manpower pool. Non-prior service applicants are currently eligible for military service if at least 18 years of age, but have not

yet reached their 35th birthday. The lower limit is automatically waived to the 17th birthday, provided that parents give written consent. For manpower management purposes, the number of 18 year-olds in the total population is used as a benchmark when projecting future defense manpower requirements. It is a much-publicized fact that after decades of steady, often dramatic growth, the United States will soon begin to experience a significant decline in the number of young men reaching their 18th birthday each year. Whereas the pool of 18 year-olds will approximate 2,136,000 in 1977, it will begin to decrease rapidly after 1979, reaching a low of 1,737,000 in 1987, a drop of some 19%.²⁰ While this situation creates serious implications for future voluntary recruiting, it alone will not be decisive. There are many management options which can be implemented to offset the inevitable decline in 18 year-olds.

Open more job fields to women. The revolution in women's rights over the past decade has had a profound impact on the prospects of the All Volunteer Force. From a low point in FY 1964 the percentage of females in the active forces rose to some 5.4% in FY 1975, and should exceed 6.4% by the end of 1977. Among Reserve Components in FY 1975, the Army Reserve had the highest composition; roughly 7% of its force was female.²¹ This level of female representation will be surpassed shortly, if the Department of the Army follows a recent suggestion by DoD. Reportedly, the Army was asked to consider increasing its female strength to 100,000 by the end of FY 1982. Assuming a stable active force of 790,000, women soldiers would account for almost 12.7% of the Army.²² At the same time, a commensurate increase in the Army's Reserve

Components would appear likely.

The future proportion of women in the Army appears to be one of the Army's most controversial issues at present, ranking with unionization, erosion of benefits, and the future of the All Volunteer Force. While the desirable proportion of women in various support units is a major topic of discussion, the question of women in combat elicits the loudest and most emotional responses. Moreover, the possibility of women in combat and related issues control the ultimate impact this alternative will have on defense manpower policy. At present, it appears that the "anti-combat" forces hold the dominant position. The Women in the Army Study Group, established by DoD, recently reported that the Army's policy of excluding women from direct combat roles "is a sound one."²³ Underscoring the disconcerting fact that many women are already assigned to support units which would deploy overseas in time of war, the group recommended that the Army redefine the term "combat". The group also found strong historical support for prohibiting the assignment of women to combat units. "It is clear that the original intent of the Congress and, by extension, the intent of the American people, was that women perform in non-combatant roles. The opinion of the Army's most experienced leaders support this position, as do surveys of Army personnel and the civilian community."²⁴ However, a decade ago no one could have predicted the situation which exists today, and this issue is still far from settled. Feminists maintain that the only reason women are not permitted in combat units is the outmoded attitudes of "traditionalists" in the military services. Prominent public figures, including Senator Proxmire, have indicated they support allowing women in combat units.²⁵

Apart from the emotional controversy, there are still a number of important questions to be resolved. Unlimited eligibility of women would roughly double the national manpower pool from which the AVF must draw, according to its proponents. Actually, in order to realize a gain of this magnitude, enlistment standards for women would have to be lowered to the same level as those of male enlistees. At present the two most significant constraints on female enlistment are mental aptitude and education. To be eligible, a young woman must score a minimum of 59 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Theoretically, this indicates that she scored higher than an average 58 females out of every 100 tested nationwide. She must also be a high school graduate or qualified GED holder. Male high school graduates, on the other hand, can qualify for Army enlistment with an AFQT score of 16, but must score at least 31 if not a high school graduate. In the past, the military services have been taking only the best qualified women applicants. A broad expansion of the female base would entail a commensurate drop in standards, greatly increasing the likelihood of a mutually unsatisfactory service experience for a much larger number of women.

The dilemma just outlined is only one of the problems which must be faced as the role of women in the Army is expanded. Hopefully, sound judgment and careful study will precede final solutions. The Defense Manpower Commission, while noting that present levels of female composition had not adversely affected unit capabilities, provided a reasonable prescription for the future. "A major concern regarding their utilization is the impact of women on the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions. Optimum utilization in a way that will not adversely affect unit capability is the objective, rather than maximum

assignment of women to all areas."²⁶ The future of women in the Army is one of the great imponderables at this time. If current mores continue to prevail, however, even a substantial expansion will offer only a partial remedy to a manpower crisis.

Expand prior service recruiting programs. The existence of this alternative may come as a surprise to some. The magnitude of its potential yield is difficult to ascertain; quite possibly it would be less than substantial. Nevertheless, prior service personnel represent a sizable market in which active Army recruiting performance has always exceeded assigned objectives. To the Reserve Components it has been an indispensable source of enlistments; without heavy prior service participation in the Selected Reserve the developing manpower crisis would have already arrived. While Reserve Component policies generally facilitate qualified prior service entry, the active force program has been highly restrictive, almost to the point of discouraging prior service reentry. The difficulty in accepting prior servicemen is that they automatically enter at a higher grade, albeit only Private E2 in many cases rather than Private E1. The very qualities which make them good enlistment risks (experience, maturity, and conformity to the military lifestyle) give them a distinct advantage over non-prior service enlistees in terms of promotion and overall advancement. Compounded by their higher entry level they tend to absorb a disproportionate share of lower and middle level enlisted promotions. As a result, advancement of non-prior service personnel stagnates, leading to frustration and dissatisfaction among that group. It should also be noted that heavy use of prior servicemen raises the average grade and longevity

of manpower, thereby raising pay costs. A similar situation faces the reserves, but they have demonstrated more flexibility, given their critical reliance on the prior service market.²⁷

Despite the adverse implications of prior service reentrants, a severe manpower crisis appears much less preferable. The active Army's complex administrative processes regulating prior service enlistment and its policy of severely restricting Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) open to prior servicemen has obscured the potential of this market. Discouraging prior service reentry may have been a sound policy during periods when non-prior service applicants were in excess supply, but it is questionable now. Conversely, the Reserve Components may well have reached the saturation point with prior service members. In reviewing Selected Reserve recruiting in the AVF era the Defense Manpower Commission noted that "recruits who had no prior service made up approximately two-thirds of the accessions in the draft years, but in FY 1975 they comprised less than one-third of the accessions."²⁸ Obviously, current reserve emphasis on non-prior service programs is well-advised.

Lower enlistment standards. This alternative focuses on the myriad regulations, standards, and qualitative controls which determine those members of the manpower pool who will be allowed to become members of the military services. To simplify analysis these measures may be grouped into five fairly distinct categories: administrative, moral, medical, mental, and educational.

Administrative prerequisites for active Army enlistment are contained in Army Regulation (AR) 601-210. Generally, administrative

criteria are limited to the areas of age, citizenship status, dependency status and, for prior service personnel, a host of special provisions. At present, only U. S. citizens and aliens admitted for permanent residence are eligible for enlistment. Since these are probably the only categories that the American public desires in its military, it is unlikely that this restriction will be lifted. Further liberalization of dependency criteria would only add to subsequent in-service problems while expanding the manpower pool very little. As pointed out earlier, prior service reentry policies may be counterproductive; however, most formal administrative prerequisites are designed to prevent the reentry of proven poor performers. Lowering or adding to the age limitations of between 18 (17 with parental consent) and 34 would appear to have a deleterious effect on a peacetime military structure. Moreover, the bulk of qualified and interested applicants over age 34 are veterans who may add their total active service to the maximum age for determining eligibility. Reserve Component administrative criteria are contained in their own regulations, but conform generally to active Army standards.

Moral standards for Army enlistment are also established by AR 601-210. The DoD and Department of the Army positions on civilian criminal records are clear. "Moral standards are also a measure of potential disciplinary performance. In this area, we strictly limit the number of enlistment waivers granted for felony police records and for drug usage."²⁹ In practice, waivers for drug convictions are handled through command channels, while determination of drug dependency rests with medical officials. In addition, a formal waiver review structure requires and processes waivers for virtually any civil

conviction to include excessive traffic violations. Multiple convictions, particularly for felony offenses, can constitute non-waivable disqualifications. As more and more young people experience involvement with police and authorities at an earlier age, the manpower pool is reduced commensurately. However, an adequate moral waiver system for meritorious individuals is already in existence. Anyone who does not warrant a waiver of moral disqualification, probably does not belong in military service.

Medical standards for enlistment in both active and Reserve Components of all services are found in AR 40-501. The question of physical fitness standards has been the object of intermittent interest and study for a number of years. To date, sweeping revisions have not been forthcoming. Moreover, it appears that the public may not have a clear understanding of current DoD policies and directives. A recent article in a national news magazine proposed the following solution to "the manpower squeeze": "Another (alternative) is lowering of physical standards to allow services to fill noncombatant jobs with men who are now being rejected because they are not physically qualified for combat."³⁰ While further lowering of standards is a valid option, it must be noted that a great many young men are accepted for enlistment every day who do not qualify physically for a combat arms assignment. Every MOS has its own minimally acceptable physical "profile," and the standards for most jobs are much less restrictive than for the combat arms. One manpower researcher, in testimony before Congress, noted that a ten-percent liberalization in weight limits would increase the available manpower by 5%. Without disputing the accuracy of this projection, it becomes apparent that the services would be forced to

accept applicants medically diagnosed as obese. Obviously, standards such as these will not produce the kind of tough, modern Army the American public expects for its tax dollars. While a comprehensive review of existing medical standards is probably overdue, shortcuts of this sort are ill-advised if the sole justification is expanding the available manpower.

It is in the area of selective relaxation of mental and educational standards that this alternative offers the greatest potential. These standards are also contained in AR 601-210, but historically have been subjected to much more frequent adjustment than criteria in the previously discussed categories. The Defense Manpower Commission noted the potential of such revisions as management tools.

The Services have demonstrated considerable flexibility in defining mental and educational standards in past years. Variations in enlistment standards have traditionally been used as a means for adjusting to varying conditions of supply and demand. The same flexibility will enhance the prospects for sustaining accession requirements in future years if unfavorable supply conditions are realized.³¹

However, the Commission had observed just a few paragraphs earlier that "if the Services retain FY 1975 mental and educational standards throughout the next 10 years, shortfalls will be more likely in both the moderate and rapid growth scenarios."³² Mental standards for both male and female non-prior service applicants were mentioned in an earlier section. With very few exceptions these standards apply equally to the Reserve Components. Specifically, minimum mental standards for non-prior service male, high school diploma graduates, are an AFQT score of at least 16 and one aptitude area score of at least 90. Non-high school graduates and GED holders must achieve an AFQT score of at least 31, with a minimum of two aptitude scores of 90 or higher. While

defining mental standards, we have also described the Army's educational criteria, with the exception that an applicant must have completed, as a minimum, the 9th grade.³³ These standards are, in fact, more stringent than the FY 1975 standards alluded to by the Defense Manpower Commission. The reader should also keep in mind that the Department of the Army has the authority to revise the standards just outlined, and has done so in the past with little or no advance notification.

The Army is firmly committed to the goal of improving, or at least maintaining, its quality content in mental and educational terms. Increasingly, the high school diploma has been adopted as the most reliable quality benchmark. The supporting rationale is outlined below by the Department of the Army.

The high school diploma has proven to be one of the most important predictors of success in the Army. The return-on-training investment favors the high school graduate by about 2 to 1. A study of FY 1975 accessions showed that 1,200 non-high school graduates had to be recruited to perform the same useful service as 1,000 diploma holders. A 1974 survey produced similar findings. The conclusion is obvious: high quality recruits are cost effective. In the long run it costs less to attract, recruit and train quality personnel because they have a lower loss rate than lower quality individuals. Also, much³⁴ of the cost of dealing with disciplinary problems is avoided.

Having established high standards, the Army faces increasing difficulty maintaining them in the face of shortfalls in active duty recruiting, and severe manpower deficiencies in the Reserve Components. While standards are established by regulation, management goals established by the Department of the Army are already falling far short of realization. Percentages of high school diploma graduates, subject to severe seasonal fluctuations in relation to traditional graduation months, have fallen off sharply from the 1975 level and are well below the Army goal of 68%.³⁵ The current level of less than 55%, including

females who must be high school graduates in order to enlist, is virtually the same as that recorded during the first six months of the AVF (Jul-Dec 1973), and well below the draft years of FY 1964 (67%) and FY 1973 (60%).³⁶

Perhaps it would be worthwhile to pause for a moment and clarify a popular misconception. High school graduate accessions and high school graduate content in the Army are two distinct entities, although they have been used interchangeably on occasion. For example, when Senator Proxmire stated that "the percentage of high-school graduates has gone from 68 per cent in 1964 to 75 per cent now,"³⁷ he appeared to contradict current accession statistics. The disparity is the result of vigorous in-service education programs throughout the Army, which have offered the AVF soldier unprecedented opportunities to obtain a high school diploma after coming on active duty. As a result, the proportion of high school graduate accessions may be declining, but the overall content of the Army is higher. Whether "the all-volunteer-force approach has improved the quality of our military personnel," as Senator Proxmire claims, is open to conjecture.³⁸

While the high school diploma graduate percentage is a closely watched quality barometer, it does not function as a formal control mechanism. The Army places great stress on recruiting high school graduates, but obviously accepts large numbers of non-graduates during periods when graduates are in short supply. A high school diploma becomes a true control only when applied in conjunction with mental standards. A vast number of non-high school graduates became ineligible early in FY 1975, when the minimum AFQT for non-graduates was raised from 10 to the present 31. At the same time, raising the minimum for

a diploma holder from 10 to 16 had an insignificant effect. While offering a quantitative estimate of the loss would be extremely difficult, the disproportionate share of the Army market which was affected can be appreciated by identifying the socio-psychological pattern of the typical volunteer.

The volunteer today - in a nonconscriptive system - selects military service in the hope of resolving an unhappy civilian, school, home and/or career situation.... Having characteristics associated with low self esteem and experiencing little opportunity for civilian career advancement is a pattern consistent with a low level of educational accomplishment.³⁹

As a consequence of its commendable quality effort, the Army has excluded from eligibility a large segment of its best market. When available supply permits, high standards are in the best interests of both the Army and the nation. Unfortunately, this policy is bound to be called into question if the All Volunteer Force falters. Indications that mental test scores are experiencing an overall decline are also apparent. During the period 1 Jul 75 - 31 Dec 75, 53% of the non-prior service male enlistees had an AFQT of 50 or higher (in the top one-half nationwide.) During the period 1 Jan 76 - 30 Jun 76 this figure dropped to 49%, although the decline may have been attributable to seasonal quality fluctuations. More ominous was the continued decline in the subsequent two quarters to 47% and 42% respectively.⁴⁰

In summary, this alternative offers a potentially rich source of additional manpower. Army and DoD manpower managers have not hesitated to adjust the quality mechanism in the past and it seems likely they will be forced to do so in the future. While the prospects of a lower quality Army are deeply disturbing, they must be balanced against the potential impact of more drastic courses of action.

Abandon policy of geographic representation. Officially, the Department of the Army would probably not acknowledge this as an option. To do so would invalidate their public position that the Army does not follow any form of representational policy. While such a policy concept has usually focused on the relative proportion of minority groups in the military services, it applies as well to geographic and other types of representation. While there is no representational policy based on race, it will be shown that de facto geographic representation does exist, whether by design or oversight.

The Defense Manpower Commission devoted considerable time and space to an examination of a representational policy and its implications for the All Volunteer Force. The Commission's assessment of the probable effects on recruiting is useful for our purposes.

The adoption of a representational policy also would make recruiting more difficult and expensive. A representational policy would impose requirements that do not exist under a "free flow" system which recruits best qualified candidates. Therefore, adjustments in recruiting operations would be required, unless the "marketplace" happened to coincide with the representational levels, which would be unlikely in the extreme. More likely, the recruiters would refrain from seeking candidates from an oversubscribed group in order to attract candidates from underrepresented groups. As a result, there would be additional efforts, increased funding and probable decreased efficiencies in the recruiting operations. It could even lead to recruiting shortfalls.⁴¹

When responding to the Commission's recommendation that "representational factors should not, as a matter of policy, affect personnel recruiting and assignment with the exception of women," the Department of the Army appeared to provide justification for a representational policy after first denying that it had one. The official Army position is stated as follows:

Army: Concur - Representational factors do not restrict an

individual's opportunity to enlist in the Army. The Army's recruiting policy is to distribute its recruiting effort to ensure that the Army career opportunity is available to all qualified men and women. By doing this, the Army makes sure that no one segment of society bears a disproportionate share of the national defense.⁴²

After a careful reading of the above position statement, it would seem that the goal established by the Army in the last sentence could only be achieved through a representational policy.

Having established the ill effects of representational policy and the Army's official position, presentation of evidence to the contrary is obviously in order. While not suggesting any correlation to a representational policy, the Defense Manpower Commission found that "the pattern of accessions during the AVF years generally has been on an equitable geographic basis."⁴³ Recently released DoD figures disclose that "based on family income, region, sex and race, the all-volunteer force is 'remarkably representative' of the American people." Furthermore, that on a regional basis "the all-volunteer force is virtually a mirror image."⁴⁴ Specific figures show that the top ten states in population, with 53% of the young male population, supplied 53% of the enlistments. Likewise, the top twenty states, with 75% of the target population, contributed 75% of the manpower.⁴⁵ While all services are represented in these statistics, the Army's share is in excess of 40%. Can this be merely a coincidence? As noted earlier, the Defense Manpower Commission termed such an eventuality "unlikely in the extreme."

Finally, analysis of the relative success of USAREC's district recruiting commands reveals that virtually all of the consistent top producers are concentrated in the Southeastern portion of the United

States, for the most part under the control of the Southeastern Regional Recruiting Command. Next most successful, and a distinct reversal from previous AVF recruiting experience, was the Northeastern Region. A serious economic slump, compounded by the most severe winter on record, enhanced the Region's productivity during the past year beyond all expectations. On the other hand, the Southwestern Region's input thus far in FY 1977 has been well below previous levels. The remaining two regions continued to experience serious shortfalls. Reproduced at Table 4-1 are district results for the period 28 Sep 76 - 21 Mar 77 as published in the USAREC command magazine. Results are depicted as number of weekly shipping periods meeting or exceeding assigned objective; a total of 23 such periods were recorded. The clear concentration of heavy producers in the Southeast and, temporarily at least, the Northeast would indicate the existence of a more substantial untapped market in these areas. While the Army operates no formal apparatus for insuring geographic representation, it accomplishes the same results through the assignment of recruiting objectives by USAREC. As pointed out in the report of the Defense Manpower Commission, the basis for assigning quotas is still the number of "Qualified Military Availables" (QMA) found in a given geographic area.⁴⁷ Based upon the estimated QMA present, USAREC apportions all of its recruiting assets and resources: recruiting force structure, automobiles, and operating funds. The sterile QMA definition allows for no distinction between military availables in Arizona, Massachusetts or Puerto Rico. Propensity to enlist, conditions of unemployment, and other dynamic variables in the area are given relatively little weight in the final objective distribution, USAREC market studies notwithstanding. In order to perpetuate geographic

Table 4-1

FY 77 Weekly Recruiting Success⁴⁴
 District Recruiting Commands by Region
 28 Sep 76 - 21 Mar 77

Southeastern	Northeastern	Southwestern	Midwestern	Western
Atlanta 23	Albany 23	Jackson 23	Cincinnati 23	Honolulu 19
Charlotte 23	Baltimore 23	Albuquerque 20	Cleveland 17	Sacramento 19
Columbia 23	Concord 23	San Antonio 16	Indianapolis 15	Phoenix 17
Jacksonville 23	Long Island 23	Dallas 15	Lansing 15	Los Angeles 11
Louisville 23	Newburgh 23	Houston 14	St Louis 14	Portland 11
Miami 23	New Haven 23	Denver 14	Chicago 14	Salt Lake City 9
Montgomery 23	Philadelphia 23	Oklahoma City 13	Columbus 13	San Francisco 8
Raleigh 23	Harrisburg 21	Little Rock 11	Detroit 10	Seattle 8
Richmond 23	Newark 16	Kansas City 9	Des Moines 8	Santa Ana 8
San Juan 23	Niagara Falls 15	New Orleans 7	Milwaukee 8	
Nashville 22	Pittsburgh 8		Peoria 8	
Beckley 16			Omaha 7	
Average		20.3	Minneapolis 2	12.6
Weeks Successful				12.1

representation, favorable markets are neglected while inordinate time and effort are expended in improving the productivity of poor markets.

A policy of geographic representation is defensible and even desirable given an overabundance of applicants. However, the rationale quickly loses validity when the situation is the opposite. The same philosophical principle which prohibits the practice of racial representation in the AVF would seem to apply equally to a policy of geographic representation. While this alternative offers little directly to the Reserve Components, it could significantly enhance the prospects for the AVF in future years.

Enhancement of Voluntary Programs

Continue present programs and policies. Undeniably, one alternative is always to do nothing, or at most make only minor adjustments. Despite the situation which currently exists, and the possibility that it will deteriorate still further, this option will continue to exercise a considerable attraction. In particular, political interests will find it convenient, as has been the case in recent years when monetary and other incentives have been proposed for the Reserve Components. As can already be deduced, virtually any major alternative has serious political implications which policy-makers are going to have to face up to. At the same time, the desirability of this alternative, as opposed to a headlong charge in the wrong direction, is evident. Any ill-advised solution is likely to have severe repercussions in the general public. While action cannot be postponed indefinitely, the Army can ill-afford to make, or have made for it, a decision which would damage the public's growing confidence in the military establishment. It appears that this

alternative might be more appropriate in the case of the active Army, than it would with the Reserve Components.

Increase enlistment incentives for the active Army. This alternative was broadly adopted during the initial period of the AVF and retained with modification down to the present time whenever Congress has appropriated the necessary funds. It has been employed as a management tool for keeping the active forces at the desired level, and somewhere close to the proper mix. A subsequent alternative will address a similar program for the Reserve Components; at this time only expanded use for the active forces will be considered.

When reviewing the broad range of "enlistment incentives," the Defense Manpower Commission correctly identified the three general categories: monetary bonuses, assignment guarantees and training guarantees. Closely associated but not included was education assistance.⁴⁸ Also not included, but significant nonetheless, was higher entry-level pay. During the transition to the AVF and its first years of success these enlistment incentives were employed with considerable effectiveness. Unfortunately, each possessed a common characteristic: high cost, either as direct monetary outlay or in the form of increased systems costs. As the AVF matured, pressure to economize on these costs mounted. Ultimately, they were eliminated or in large measure reduced. Bonuses were cut back, the G. I. Bill for educational assistance was terminated and attractive but expensive enlistment options were scrapped.

As cracks have begun to appear in the AVF structure, defense planners and their advisers have turned to enlistment incentives as a tool for reversing the trend. As one manpower researcher recently

observed, "if the nation decides it wants a volunteer force, it is a feasible proposition."⁴⁹ Implicit in this argument, a familiar refrain from the end-the-draft days, is that money can buy anything and the public should be willing to pay any price in order to save the AVF. However, an increasing number of prominent public officials and private citizens are questioning whether the price might not already be too high.

A comprehensive review of the present and projected costs of the AVF versus a conscript force is beyond the capabilities and scope of this study. However, that fact should not preclude a brief discussion of several key points, particularly those issues already publicly surfaced. In reference to higher entry-level pay, it is incontestable that a given increase will produce some increase in enlistments. Estimating accurately how much is required to achieve the desired result is extremely difficult, however. At some point it seems likely that we would simply be hiring mercenaries, in the true sense of the word. On the other hand, proponents of a lower cost conscript force must recognize that fiscal savings may not be as great as anticipated. As former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld noted, "I don't believe that we ought to use compulsion as a crutch for paying men and women in the armed services half or two-thirds of what they could be making in the civilian manpower market."⁵⁰ Other manpower analysts have recently emphasized the same point, while minimizing the fiscal savings to be expected from a return to the draft.

Expanded educational assistance is already a closed issue. G. I. Bill education benefits are no longer available to new enlisted although the participatory Defense Educational Assistance Program w

replaces it will help to fill the void. On the other hand, expanding enlistment bonuses are still a viable option. Bonuses for the combat arms or critically short MOS are still being employed effectively. Increasing these and creating new ones would capitalize on a proven technique for generating moderate increases in enlistment totals. There is a practical limit to the size of such bonuses and in the past have not produced large-scale enlistment responses.

Other potentially lucrative options are available in the area of assignment and training guarantees. These programs have the advantage of negligible direct monetary outlay, as is the case for bonuses, although they will result in increased systems costs. The Army's one year travel-or-training option; the two and three year Regular Army unassigned option; the three year guaranteed training and stabilization option; and the straight station-of-choice option all proved highly popular in the early years of the AVF, but have since been eliminated or drastically reduced in the interests of economy and force stabilization. While personnel turbulence has been reduced to a modern minimum and a return to earlier programs would be highly disruptive, some degree of sacrifice in this area may be unavoidable in the future.

Increase enlistment incentives for the Reserve Components

This alternative is the Reserve Components corollary to the previous option, and focuses on enhancing the voluntary entry process by providing a wide assortment of enlistment incentives. As with the active forces, these measures encompass not only purely financial incentives such as higher entry-level pay and bonuses, but extend to other programs which would offer both tangible and intangible inducements. Unlike

active components, however, there is little empirical data upon which to project their effectiveness as recruiting tools.

Beginning with early studies of the proposed all-volunteer force, defense manpower researchers have strongly recommended a ful program of financial incentives and expanded benefits. An analysis underscored the inherent flaws in a volunteer Army which had to be dealt with: ". . . all-volunteer forces have the attraction of quality and high mobility . . . but suffer from their quantitative weakness, especially in reserves."⁵¹ Recognizing the need for incentives program, the Department of Defense pressed for Congressional approval of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses as early as May 1970, but without avail.⁵² In November, 1972, the Research Analysis Corporation published an exhaustive study entitled, appropriately, "Management of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment." In four volumes, it analyzed a wide variety of options with the goal of recommending the most cost effective combination of incentives and other measures for maintaining desired strength levels.⁵³ Unfortunately, their recommendations have been subjected to piecemeal and incomplete adoption over the past few years, and this excellent research effort is now somewhat forgotten. Defense officials, representatives of the Reserve Components, and power experts have consistently advocated adoption of an effective incentives package. The Defense Manpower Commission recommended "new enlistment incentives should be considered for the Nation's active and Reserve programs with a view toward achieving a higher level of quality of nonprior service accessions."⁵⁴ Amidst sporadic fluctuations in activity and publicity, manpower planners have sought unsuccessfully to assemble an incentives package acceptable to the Congress. The

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recent submission of draft legislation has been designated the Components Readiness Improvement Package (RCRIP) and it proposes the following.

They (the incentives) include education assistance, a ceiling on retirement points that may be accrued annually in connection with required training, a federal tax exemption of a portion of income earned as an RC member, extension of Service members' Group Life Insurance coverage, reduction of initial training time for the male Civilian Acquired Skills Program, authorization to reimburse civilian recruiters for out-of-pocket expenses, direct enlistment into the IRR and an enlistment/re-enlistment bonus.⁵⁵

Ideally, most if not all of this imposing list should be approached. Judging solely from past performance, however, the prognosis is encouraging. Cost will undoubtedly be the most critical factor, is substantial. Estimates of RCRIP's annual cost are \$500 million for the ARNG and USAR Selected Reserve, and an additional \$250 million for programs to improve IRR strength.⁵⁶ But a new mood may be developing, as typified by Senator Nunn's recent comment that "we're going to do almost as much for the reserves as for the active force".⁵⁷ of incentives, increased pay and bonuses."

Even if a comprehensive Reserve Components incentives package is passed by Congress, expectations of its effectiveness should be realistic. Obviously, it is essential to take this first step. Reserves are to be maintained on a voluntary basis. And in view of the active Army's experience, there is every reason to believe it will be successful, while perhaps not the total panacea desired. As one analyst noted ominously: "What if the root of the problem is attitudinal in nature?"⁵⁸

Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recruitment process

process. This alternative applies to both the active forces and the Reserve Components. However, in view of the unprecedented resources and managerial ability funneled into the U. S. Army Recruiting Command over the past five years, the reserve system appears particularly overdue for revitalization.

Early in the AVF era former Defense Secretary Schlesinger identified the two basic causes of personnel shortages in the Reserve Components: expiration of induction authority and an associated absence of recruiting personnel and expertise.⁵⁹ As in the case of an incentives package, however, recognizing the problem proved easier than effecting a remedy. As noted in Chapter 3, Reserve Component recruiting has been and remains largely a command responsibility. This has some advantages, but also a host of serious disadvantages, particularly during periods of manpower scarcity. In recent testimony before Congress, a DoD reserve affairs specialist estimated that many commanders were spending more than half their time on recruiting and retention activities.⁶⁰ The resulting degradation of unit readiness and training is incalculable. In subsequent testimony the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy summarized the problem as one of applying to the reserves the recruiting skills acquired by the active forces in the volunteer era.⁶¹ His comments confirmed an observation made earlier by the Defense Manpower Commission:

Funds, staffing, emphasis, and priorities by necessity have been focused upon the active forces and the maintenance of the active force level with quality accessions. There has not been a corollary emphasis for recruitment programs in the National Guard and Reserves....A full commitment to the Total Force policy in the area of recruitment will require additional funds, new policies and priorities, and high-level attention.⁶²

Elsewhere in their report, the Commission conducted an in-depth review

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MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES AND A DRAFT FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.(U)
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
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of recruiting policies and structures, including those of the Army's Reserve Components. Recognizing the critical need for an expanded reserve recruiting system, the Departments of Defense and the Army have directed that some 1,000 U.S. Army Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers be brought on active duty as full-time recruiters. Plans for expanded authorizations for both the Guard and Reserve were also being studied.⁶³

The creation of a highly professional Reserve Components recruiting force will represent a quantum leap forward for the reserves in their efforts to remain viable in a zero-draft environment. It will be a difficult challenge and current initiatives may prove inadequate to the task. Nevertheless, the All Volunteer concept will not have received a fair chance to succeed until reserve recruiters have been brought up to the same level of proficiency as those of the active Army. Some experts would achieve this end simply by relieving the reserves of responsibility for Reserve Component recruiting and transferring it to the U. S. Army Recruiting Command. This proposal has been studied exhaustively in the past and rejected. Project ARCSTAR (1975-76) tested this concept and the results were not encouraging. Practical arguments and empirical evidence aside, saddling USAREC with this massive additional burden at a time when active recruiting is suffering would be a needlessly self-inflicted wound.

While scant attention has been given in this section to active Army recruiting, the AUSA Special Report cited earlier made a strong case for restoring the recruiting budget to its pre-FY 1976 level, in terms of constant dollars. The report noted that "the Army was making real progress in improving quality after the shift to a volunteer

footing until FY 76 when a downward trend set in, paralleling a cut in financial support of the recruiting effort.⁶⁴ Although quality decline may not be solely attributable to a reduced recruiting budget, there appears to be a strong relationship between the two.

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Improve and expand retention programs. Traditionally, the term "retention" has been synonymous with "reenlistment." Lately, however, retention has acquired greater meaning beyond mere reenlistment, although the latter remains a significant aspect of the former. This alternative would seek to improve our reenlistment, tighten somewhat liberal discharge policies, and attain a higher career content in both the active and reserve forces. The net result of the measures just mentioned would be the reduction of defense manpower requirements and associated costs by retaining personnel in the force structure for longer periods of time.

Reenlistment is a command responsibility in both the active and reserve forces. Since the inception of the AVF it has risen to a position of high visibility at the unit level, where commanders must make a strong personal effort to keep their good people in the service for another term. Noting that economic conditions influence reenlistments in much the same manner as they do initial enlistments from the civilian sector, the Defense Manpower Commission proceeded to define the relationship between reenlistment objectives and career force content.

Service reenlistment objectives are fundamentally defined by career force structuring considerations....Currently, projected reenlistment objectives represent the numbers of first-termers who must join the career component of the force each year to maintain an optimal balance between career and noncareer components. The services could choose to alter this balance in

the future...In general a shift towards an older force than currently planned would eventually reduce the annual demand for enlisted accessions.⁶⁵

Because of their effect on overall defense manpower requirements, reenlistment rates are subject to close scrutiny. A Congressional Budget Office study recently called the Army to task because rates were lower than originally forecast, and estimated an increased cost in manpower of \$1.2 billion.⁶⁶ Whether the Army had any effective control over the lower rates is debatable. In a related matter, the author of a highly publicized Senate research report has advocated that the Army move toward "a more career-rich force" by regulating career/noncareer force content to a point of parity. At present the ratio approximates a 58 to 42 mix in favor of shorter term soldiers. A 50 to 50 ratio would result in considerable cost savings, according to the study.⁶⁷ Again, whether this is totally desirable and whether reenlistment rates will remain high enough to permit this type of manipulation are still largely unanswered. A force of oldsters, for example, is a handicap in the demanding tactical environment of the modern battlefield.

The other major aspect of retention which could yield substantial manpower savings is a review of Army discharge policies for first-termers who fail to complete their initial term of service. In particular, the Trainee Discharge Program and the Expedited Discharge Program have become increasingly popular with harried commanders. In fact, their use has started to reach alarming proportions, as noted below.

Attrition among first-term enlistees has reached the very high rate of 37%, up from 25% in the last year of the mixed draftee-volunteer force (1972), in seeming contradistinction to what was probably the major budgetary assumption behind the all-volunteer decision: that the costs of necessarily higher

pay would be offset by lower turnover.⁶⁸

The prospect of supposedly well-qualified volunteers, in a climate of enlightened leadership, experiencing a substantially higher discharge rate than the old mixed force is indeed disturbing. Moreover, the potentially adverse effect on future recruiting which results from returning these disenchanted individuals to their hometowns cannot be lightly dismissed. The authority to promptly discharge clearly unmotivated or unsuitable personnel is a tool commanders have long sought, but there are indications that its exercise may have been too liberal. If its expediency value becomes a substitute for good leadership, it can result in a severe and costly loss of manpower at a critical decision point for the All Volunteer Force.

Introduction of Involuntary Programs

At this point both quantitative variables in the defense manpower model have been analyzed, as has the procedural variable in its voluntary mode. The final group of alternatives will focus on four involuntary procedural options which are reasonably available to the United States. The first is little more than compulsory retention and could perhaps have properly been reviewed within an earlier grouping. However, in view of its distinctly involuntary character its inclusion here seems more appropriate. The final three alternatives concern compulsory induction into Total Force military service. One, the creation of a draft for the Reserve Components, will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. Likewise, an analysis of the two remaining alternatives, an active force draft and universal national service, could best be accomplished by integrating them into the examination of a Reserve

Components draft. Consequently, these programs will be discussed only in a preliminary manner at this time, and will be developed more fully in the succeeding chapter.

Extend the reserve obligation and include women. For a number of years every male entering any form of military service has acquired a total service obligation of six years from date of initial entry. Females have been exempted by law from these provisions. Of these six years, it was not anticipated that all would be spent in full-time active or reserve service. If enlisting into the active forces this normally meant a specified period on active duty (two, three or four years,) followed by service in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) until the end of the fifth year of obligation, and then transfer to the Standby Reserve for the final year. If enlisting into the Reserve Components, active participation in the Selected Reserve for a period of four years was usually followed by a year each of IRR and Standby Reserve service. Draftees served two years active, two or three years IRR, and the remainder in Standby Reserve. It is apparent that during the years of heavy draft calls this system generated huge amounts of obligated manpower for all reserve categories. It should be equally apparent that since the demise of the draft this system will have to undergo substantial modification if future manpower needs are to be met. The current personnel status of the Reserve Components was discussed in some detail in Chapter 3 and will not be repeated here.

The alternative offered at this point was first recommended by the Total Force Study in 1975, and is directed primarily at maintaining higher manpower levels in the IRR. The study group's specific

recommendation was part of its manpower management guidance for the Total Force.

The General Counsel should prepare proposed legislation providing for people entering military service to have a Ready Reserve obligation through age 28, and eliminating the requirement that after five years reservists be transferred to the Standby Reserve upon request. In addition, the legislation should require each IRR to keep his service notified of any change in address, job, or physical condition.⁶⁹

While Congress rejected this proposal last year, it is certain to be brought up again in view of the unimpeded deterioration of the IRR pool.⁷⁰ It does have significant advantages as a one-shot remedy. Extending the obligation would provide immediate relief, and placing women under its provisions would help still more. Continued exemption of women in the future would appear to be an unsupportable policy. A related option has also been proposed which would eliminate the Standby Reserve altogether. While bolstering the IRR numerically, such action would also facilitate future mobilizations by eliminating time-consuming call-ups from the Standby Reserve.

Although the proposal to extend the reserve obligation to age 28 or 29 might provide immediate relief to the depleted IRR, it would almost certainly inhibit or degrade the voluntary enlistment programs of both the active forces and the Reserve Components. At present, the existence of a six year obligation is not widely known among the general public. When potential enlistees are informed of the commitment, their initial hesitancy can usually be overcome by outlining and minimizing the probable extent of their obligations: three or four years active duty, one or two years IRR and a final year of Standby Reserve for active Army enlistees. However, to the average 17 or 18 year-old the prospect of three years active duty followed by Selected and/or

Individual Ready Reserve until age 28 or 29 would likely be viewed as indefinite vulnerability to service in any future war. Moreover, the mobilization of IRR personnel seven or eight years after their release from active duty is of doubtful value in terms of physical and occupational readiness. Finally, such a proposal penalizes those who have already served, at a time when so many do not serve at all. Despite its advantages then, this option is far from ideal.

Reinstitute the draft for the active Army. Preceding chapters have dealt specifically with the nation's conscription experiences. No responsible observer, before or after the end of the draft in 1973, has proposed that the United States could fight a major or lengthy conflict without conscription. While we may no longer possess responsive machinery with which to carry out the tasks of mobilization, resumption of the draft in time of war is still an explicit assumption. The question which must be faced once again is whether peacetime conscription is the only way to meet military manpower requirements. As mentioned earlier, this alternative will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 5.

Institute a draft only for the Reserve Components. This alternative is the principal object of interest in this study and will also be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. Virtually ignored until recent months, this option had received some serious consideration from the Department of Defense as early as 1972. After noting "early indications of shortfalls in strength of the Selected Reserves," then-Secretary Laird mentioned the possibility of "legislation which would allow us to draft people into the Selected Reserves."⁷¹ However, he rejected

such action, at least temporarily.

The possible use of a draft for the Selected Reserve of the Guard and Reserve may, as noted, become a necessity, but it is not considered such today. I believe that, if the incentives we are developing go forward and are implemented, we can attract adequate men and women volunteers for the National Guard and Reserve. I do not want to press for a draft authorization unless that becomes absolutely necessary, and I do not think that it is at that point.⁷²

While now widely discussed as a possible course of action, observers are generally of the opinion that it stands little chance of adoption, as noted below.

Although the reserve-only draft has been advanced as a possible solution by Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, Army chief of staff, and other defense officials, observers believe that Congress and the public will never accept conscription for what is still viewed as the second line of defense, despite the "total force" philosophy.⁷³

As with any form of compulsory service, the prospect of a reserves-only draft would precipitate spirited public and Congressional debate. The possible configuration and implications of this alternative will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Offer military service as an option in a National Service Program. This final alternative is one of the most intriguing to be proposed. The concept of service to the Nation has a deep historical foundation, and specific proposals have circulated for several decades. President Roosevelt's economic recovery program capitalized on this technique with the Civilian Conservation Corps and a wide assortment of similar agencies. During the early years of the anti-Vietnam, anti-draft debate, proponents of both compulsory and voluntary national service stated their views in the public forum.⁷⁴ After a period of academic popularity, national service advocates lapsed into relative

obscurity with the end of the war and the advent of the All Volunteer Force. Only recently military sociologist Charles Moskos remarked of his fellow members in the Inter-University Seminar: "I'd guess that more than half of them wish a national service system of some kind were possible. But they know that almost no one in Congress would vote for it."⁷⁵ While this assessment may still be valid to some degree, it is apparent that in the short span of a year opinion on this subject is now more favorable. The economic and social effects of widespread unemployment, and the philosophic direction of President Carter's administration have fueled interest in such programs. As with other forms of compulsory service, this alternative will be investigated thoroughly in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

FOOTNOTES

¹"The Draft: Both Sides of Debate," U.S. News & World Report, LXXXII, 6 (February 14, 1977), p. 60.

²Ibid.

³U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975, March, 1974 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 83.

⁴Ibid., p. 97.

⁵Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Our Shrinking Manpower Resources: Cracks Worry Volunteer Helmets," Army, April, 1977, p. 20.

⁶Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security, April, 1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 103.

⁷U.S., Department of Defense, op. cit., p. 96.

⁸U.S., Department of Defense, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force (U), June, 1975 (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975), pp. 6-7.

⁹Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 104.

¹⁰"Manpower for the Military - Draft or Volunteer?", (Washington: Association of the United States Army Special Report, 1977), p. 16.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ludvigsen, op. cit., p. 20.

¹³Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 104.

¹⁴Roy A. Werner, "The Other Military: Are U.S. Reserve Forces Viable?", Military Review, April, 1977, p. 31. (See also pp. 29-30).

¹⁵"A Talk With Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor," Army, April, 1977, p. 40.

¹⁶U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report FY 75, op. cit., p. 190.

¹⁷ Werner, op. cit., p. 22, and Ludvigsen, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁸ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 148.

¹⁹ U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report FY 75, op. cit., p. 190.

²⁰ "Bring Back the Draft?", U.S. News & World Report, LXXXII, 6 (February 14, 1977), pp. 56-57.

²¹ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 164.

²² "Army Told to Double WAC Force," Army Times, March 14, 1977, p. 4. See also Larry Carney, "Women's Role Still Undecided," Army Times, May 9, 1977, p. 4.

²³ Larry Carney, "'Combat Zone' WAC Jobs Weighed," Army Times, April 4, 1977, p. 3.

²⁴ "Women in the Army Study," Army Personnel Letter, No. 4-77, April, 1977, pp. 1-3.

²⁵ "The Draft: Both Sides of Debate," op. cit., p. 60.

²⁶ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., pp. 248-49.

²⁷ Andy Plattner, "Hearings Stress Incentives," Army Times, March 28, 1977, p. 12.

²⁸ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 156.

²⁹ U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report FY 75, op. cit., p. 178.

³⁰ "Bring Back the Draft?", op. cit., p. 58.

³¹ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 410.

³² Ibid., p. 409. ³³ Chapter 2, AR 601-210.

³⁴ "Maintaining a Quality Force," Commanders Call, Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-832, March-April, 1977, p. 7.

³⁵ "Bring Back the Draft?", op. cit., p. 55. See also "Recruit Quality Takes Dip," Army Times, May 16, 1977, p. 43.

³⁶ U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report FY 75, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁷ "The Draft: Both Sides of Debate," op. cit., p. 59.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Scott M. Cunningham, "The Volunteer Soldier: His Needs, Attitudes and Expectations," CINECOM Corporation Report No. 72-2, (Cambridge: CINECOM Corporation, 1972), p. 28.

⁴⁰"Enlisted Aptitude Levels Take Dip," Army Times, March 28, 1977, p. 2.

⁴¹Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 172.

⁴²U.S., Department of the Army, Position on Recommendations of the Defense Manpower Commission, Undated (Washington: Department of the Army, 1976), p. 36.

⁴³Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 165.

⁴⁴Jay Finegan, "DoD: All-Vol Forces Reflect Nation's Image," Army Times, March 14, 1977, p. 25.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶"Quality and Quantity," Army Recruiting and Career Counseling Journal, April, 1977, p. 22.

⁴⁷Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., pp. 193-94.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 191-92. ⁴⁹Ludvigsen, op. cit., p. 21.

⁵⁰"Bring Back the Draft?", op. cit., p. 52.

⁵¹Erwin Hackel, Military Manpower and Political Purpose, Adelphi Papers No. 72, (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 30.

⁵²U.S., Department of Defense, Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, August, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 40.

⁵³William L. Clement, and others, "Maintenance of Reserve Components in a Volunteer Environment," (New York: Research Analysis Corporation, 1972), Vol. I, pp. S-1 to S-6.

⁵⁴Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 192.

⁵⁵"Reserve Component Readiness Improvement," Army Personnel Letter, No. 2-77, February, 1977, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁶"Manpower for the Military - Draft or Volunteer?", op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁷ "The Draft: Both Sides of Debate," op. cit., p. 60.

⁵⁸ Werner, op. cit., p. 30.

⁵⁹ U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report FY 75, op. cit., p. 192.

⁶⁰ Plattner, op. cit., p. 12.

⁶¹ "414,000 Active Duty Troops, 250,000 Reservists Needed," Army Times, April 4, 1977, p. 20.

⁶² Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., pp. 206-7.

⁶³ Larry Carney, "OMB Ax Swings at USAR," Army Times, December 27, 1976, p. 3. See also "More Recruiting Cash Asked for Reserves," Army Times, February 21, 1977, p. 16.

⁶⁴ "Manpower for the Military - Draft or Volunteer?", op. cit., pp. 6, 7, 30.

⁶⁵ Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., pp. 410-11.

⁶⁶ "Bring Back the Draft?", op. cit., p. 58.

⁶⁷ Ludvigsen, op. cit., p. 21.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

⁶⁹ U.S., Department of Defense, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷⁰ Ludvigsen, op. cit., p. 21.

⁷¹ U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973, February, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 163-64.

⁷² Ibid., p. 165.

⁷³ Ludvigsen, op. cit., p. 22.

⁷⁴ See especially Sol Tax, ed., The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

⁷⁵ Bruce Bliven, Jr., Volunteers, One and All (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976), p. 125.

Chapter 5

IMPLICATIONS OF A RESERVE COMPONENT DRAFT

WHAT FORM SHOULD COMPULSORY SERVICE TAKE?

Earlier chapters described the nature and magnitude of an impending manpower crisis in the All Volunteer Force. In the preceding chapter usable manpower alternatives were identified and outlined in general terms. The purpose of that examination was to provide a sound basis for the development of future policies and programs designed to deal effectively with the crisis. It was felt that consideration of all available options was imperative if a draft for the Reserve Components, the central focus of this study, was to be evaluated in a meaningful, responsible manner. As noted previously, this option is to be analyzed concurrently with two other forms of compulsory military service: reinstitution of a draft for the active forces and universal national service. While the question posed in this section appears to presume a decision to implement some form of compulsory service, this study will offer no such recommendation. Rather this question will be considered merely hypothetical, serving as the point of departure for a further examination of the relative merits of compulsory service alternatives.

The question "What form should compulsory service take?" cannot be adequately addressed until a consensus has been reached as to what

it is we would hope to accomplish. All three forms of compulsory service share common characteristics and are capable of fulfilling some or all of the nation's manpower needs if the AVF should fail. Nevertheless, they are also fundamentally different, each best suited for a particular situation or set of circumstances. Debate on involuntary programs is bound to be frustrating and nonproductive unless there is substantial agreement on objectives. For example, the absence of a basic consensus was rarely more evident than during the brief popularity, particularly in academic circles, of the various draft era proposals for national service. Some advocates saw it as a better means of meeting military manpower requirements. A number saw it primarily as a device for legitimizing draft avoidance, while others hoped to widen outlets for the altruistic impulses of American youth.¹ In spite of fervent and articulate support, the United States consistently rejected the concept of universal national service in the years leading up to the AVF. For a number of reasons, practical as well as philosophical, such a system was not considered in the best interests of the nation at that time. Disparate perceptions of national objectives and needs resulted in the promotion of an alternative which was simply irrelevant given our heavy involvement in the Vietnam War.

Having thus touched on universal national service as an option, it would probably be advisable to continue our analysis to completion. The fact that the Clark Panel² and the Marshall Commission³ in 1967, and the Gates Commission⁴ in 1970 all rejected this concept should not necessarily invalidate it today. In fact, its basic appeal would seem enhanced, at least in one significant respect. In rejecting universal national service, the Clark Panel noted "that it would be impossible to

devise an acceptable formula for equating non-military service with military duty, particularly in time of war.⁵ This oft-recited argument loses much of its validity in peacetime, however, and especially when we already have an All Volunteer Force. Moreover, if the inherent uniqueness of military service is acknowledged through a system of benefits and incentives, there is little reason to seek a formula equating it with other forms of national service. The public must be aware, however, that this rationale pertains only to a peacetime situation. The assumed reactivation of the draft in time of war would terminate entry into alternative forms of service. In other words, a program of universal national service offering "equivalent" options is viable, but only in time of peace, and then only when the unique character of military service is adequately recognized. Within these restrictions, a program of universal national service is a feasible device for meeting defense manpower requirements. The potential impact of this type of program on AVF recruiting prospects will be evaluated later in this chapter.

In other respects, the traditional arguments of national service critics would seem to apply with greater relevancy. Perhaps the most serious has been the charge "against national service that to achieve its objectives would require wholly unparalleled state control of human endeavor, far beyond the constitutional provision for conscription to provide for the common defense."⁶ Stated more directly, it may be unconstitutional, as well as inherently alien to our form of democracy. While the potential dilution of the present high quality of service rendered by such voluntary organizations as VISTA and the Peace Corps is also a serious consideration, probably the greatest single obstacle

would be cost. Critics of the skyrocketing federal budget and burgeoning governmental bureaucracy point to the staggering impracticalities of administering a compulsory national service program just for the 2.1 million young men who will reach age 18 in 1977. If young women were added to the program, as many would demand, the difficulty approaches insurmountable dimensions. Despite such inherent drawbacks, this alternative will receive renewed attention in future months. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, recently proposed the following:

We ought to examine a national-service option which would not be confined simply to the military but would encompass much more than that. It might involve environmental work, Peace Corps work, VISTA work, urban or rural-area work - those kinds of things. Within that compulsory national service we possibly could still have a voluntary military service.⁷

As military manpower policy becomes more deeply enmeshed in a potential debate over universal national service, planners should pause to consider the advice offered by manpower analyst Richard V. L. Cooper at Senator Nunn's hearings. "If we go to national service it should be to serve other national goals, not because the all-volunteer force has failed."⁸ As discussed earlier, military manpower needs could be met under such a system; however, serious consideration of the alternative clearly rests with the nation's civilian leadership and not the military.

If adoption of a compulsory national service system appears an imperfect solution, the prospects of returning to a full draft for the active forces is hardly more attractive. Nevertheless, civilian officials have demonstrated a frank and open attitude in discussions of this eventuality which is in marked contrast to that exhibited in

earlier AVF years. In a visit to the Pentagon in early March, 1977, President Carter outlined his personal views on the subject during a question-and-answer session.

As I said many times during the campaign, if it ever becomes obvious to me and to the military leaders who serve with me that we cannot adequately provide for the defense of our country without a draft, I would not hesitate to recommend such a change to the Congress - to call for a draft clause.⁹

While apparently willing to accept the "political trauma" attendant to a return to the draft, responsible officials would be well-advised to exhaust all other alternatives before taking such action. The disruptive and destructive nature of the draft debate during the Vietnam War has been discussed earlier in some detail. While a return to a full draft would not recreate the conditions of 1965-72, it seems inevitable that a draft would result in some reaction within the general society, the extent of which we are unlikely to ascertain ahead of time. Probably few observers could accept Morris Janowitz' recent assertion that "conscription is at an end; whether you like it or not, that is a fact in the modern world."¹⁰ Nevertheless, his thoughtful comment underscores the difficulties inherent in "turning the clock back." The philosophical desirability of compulsory military service is not a concern of this study; if no other alternative is satisfactory it may be necessary to reinstitute the draft. If it is, however, the government and the nation must realize that the question posed by the Marshall Commission ten years ago, "Who serves when not all serve?", can never be answered in a manner satisfactory to all. This dilemma was at the heart of the Vietnam era draft controversy and will still have to be addressed by any future program. One scholarly study of Selective Service operations summarized the situation thusly:

Such proportionately lower military needs and the existence of a manpower surplus have changed the task of the Selective Service System and altered its effects. The System was designed to produce men for the armed forces, with those exceptions which the "national interest" appeared to justify. But in recent years, its priorities were reversed; it had to find ways to defer large proportions of men, inducting only those small numbers actually required. In the process, deferment criteria lost their rationale, variability between local boards were (sic) exacerbated, and discrimination along economic lines developed.¹¹

No attempt will be made here to find an answer which has eluded several blue-ribbon inquiries in the past decade. We may be more productive if we assume at the outset that inequality will be inherent in any system devised by man, and proceed to reduce that inequality to the lowest possible level. Such a pragmatic approach will not be universally applauded in a society conditioned to theoretical equality, but there appears to be no other choice. This was essentially the strategy of the Nixon Administration in 1969, when it initiated substantial reform of the Selective Service System prior to creation of the AVF. Most significant was the introduction of a random lottery system for determining the order of induction. Furthermore, this system incorporated a "youngest first" feature which was designed to ultimately reduce draft vulnerability to a single calendar year. The reforms initiated were in large measure those proposed earlier by the Marshall Commission.¹² If the need for such basic reforms had been recognized sooner, the legacy of that era might now be a lighter burden.

Had these reforms been adopted earlier, even as late as the mid-1960's, they might have done much to counter widespread erosion among the nation's youth, especially its college students, in their sense of obligation to military service and national security. Instead, reform was delayed, and reaction to the Vietnam War compounded the perceived inequities in Selective Service channeling. The result has been a stronger resistance to conscription, and spreading cynicism toward individual obligations and national security needs.¹³

Unfortunately, history cannot be changed. We can, however, learn from our past mistakes. While a random lottery and, to a lesser degree, the "youngest first" philosophy still have their critics, it is difficult to project a future system of conscription which did not incorporate these two features. Selecting the relative few who must serve will be a very real problem, particularly since the dominant trend in modern warfare is no longer the mass army, but technology.

Finally, the structural inequities in the Selective Service System of the Vietnam era were perpetuated and exacerbated by the functioning of the local draft boards. While individual board members may have approached their duties in a spirit of impartial patriotism and community service, the actual operation of these archaic institutions was probably the Service's greatest single weakness. The consequences were disasterous.

We see instead an intricate meshing of deferment policies and organizational characteristics which has the combined effect of offering alternatives to military services to the sons of the higher socioeconomic strata while conferring the management of deferments and inductions upon community influentials drawn from the same strata. The most politically aware and efficacious members of the society are thus both advantaged and coopted by the present System.¹⁴

At a time when a possible return to the draft is being contemplated, we should closely note the three central findings of the comprehensive study of local board functioning cited above. These were: variability and nonuniformity originate in decentralization and autonomy; local boards are not "Little Groups of Neighbors"; and local boards are not generally considered a desirable means of conducting conscription.¹⁵ The researchers summarized their conclusions as follows:

We take these data and findings to indicate that nonuniformity is caused by decentralization and local autonomy, and that there are no compensating returns realized in the way of "little groups of neighbors" effects or broad popular approval from these System characteristics....The point is that nonuniformity is extensive, that its causes carry no compensating returns, that it offends traditional and relevant values, that it provokes complaint and reduces support, and that it is unnecessary.¹⁶

Turning to the subject of a draft solely to fill the Reserve Components, we have no previous experience with which to compare it, nor can we benefit from past public deliberation, as in the case of the national service alternative. Nevertheless, the attitudes and experiences which would shape either of the more familiar options would similarly influence a reserve draft. Development of the precise obligation which a reserve draft would impose on inductees need not be confined solely to historic conscription models, but could relate directly to the contemporary manpower environment. Length of total obligation, reserve category to be filled, and distribution of service term between categories appear to be the major variables which would shape a draft for the reserves. For example, the present six year obligation could be either shortened or lengthened for reserve inductees. Moreover, reservists need not be inducted into the Selected Reserves, but might be assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve after a period of Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT). Any reserve draft should have as its goal satisfaction of manpower requirements with minimal social disruption and individual coercion. Careful planning can insure the realization of this goal.

EVALUATING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CONSCRIPTION

Failure of the All Volunteer Force will precipitate a classic

confrontation between political interests and national security needs. Selection of a new alternative would thus be a political process involving government, the general public, and a host of special interest groups. Hopefully, the final product of such a process would reflect to some degree the participation of all parties concerned. Public support for any compulsory program will be vital to its successful implementation and subsequent operation. To point out that public opinion is a potent force in the United States is to belabor the obvious. Normally inchoate, it could seriously impair the functioning of any compulsory service program which lacked a basic consensus. In the process, the military establishment and national security would suffer accordingly.

Public support for a return to a full-scale draft is largely a matter of conjecture at this time, although pollsters have recently turned their attention to this question. The special manpower report of the Association of the United States Army disclosed a recent Gallup Opinion Poll which surveyed reactions to a future draft. Gallup's conclusions were quoted as follows: "Although America's armed forces continue to have difficulties meeting manpower needs with volunteers, the public, at least for the moment, rejects the idea of returning to the draft." Reportedly, 54% of all Americans opposed a return to the draft, while 36% were in favor. Among males in the 18 to 24 age group the response was "overwhelmingly" negative, with 82% opposed, 13% in favor, and 5% no opinion.¹⁷ In view of its inherent nature and unfavorable associations from the past, this alternative would probably command the least enthusiastic public support of any of the compulsory options.

A draft for the Reserve Components would entail some of the

same drawbacks, in particular the aspect of enforced participation in military activities. Consequently, it might fail to attract public support in a manner similar to an active forces draft. Whether it would be relatively more attractive is again an open question. Despite high-level interest in a reserves-only draft some observers believe, as reported in the previous chapter, "that Congress and the public will never accept conscription for what is still viewed as the second line of defense, despite the 'total force' philosophy."¹⁸ On the other hand, outgoing Secretary of the Army Hoffman has indicated his belief that the nation would more willingly accept a draft for the reserves than for the active forces.¹⁹ Conflicting opinions aside, common sense would suggest that the relative acceptance of a reserve draft by the American people would depend largely on how the program was presented to them and what they perceived the alternatives to be. Hopefully, opinion surveys on this key question will be forthcoming.

We are fortunate in having available reliable public opinion data on the acceptability of a national service program. A Gallup Opinion Poll conducted 10-13 December 1976 disclosed broad public support of national service for men. Sixty-two percent of all respondents replied favorably to the question: "Would you favor or oppose requiring all young men to give one year of service to the nation - either in the military forces, or in non-military work here or abroad, such as VISTA or the Peace Corps?" Thirty-three percent said they were opposed and 5% had no opinion.²⁰ Support among young men age 18 to 24, the group most directly affected by such a program, was noticeably less enthusiastic. Forty-seven percent were in favor while 50% were opposed.²¹ A followup question, concerning participation of young women in such a

program, was also received with much less favor. Thirty percent of all respondents were in favor, 51% were opposed, and 9% had no opinion.²²

Related questions probing the respondents' inclinations toward military service over non-military options produced some interesting results.

Forty-three percent of all young men age 18 to 24 indicated they would choose military service when asked the question: "Suppose all young men were required to give one year of service, which would you prefer - military or non-military service?" Fifty-one percent would choose a non-military option, while 6% had no opinion.²³ Analysts who view women as a limitless pool of manpower for the AVF should take note of the response when a similar question was asked concerning young women. Of young women age 18 to 24, only 20% indicated they would choose a military option.²⁴

Drawing ironclad conclusions from this poll should be discouraged, however. All questions hypothesized a one year period of obligated service, which is only half what most military planners would view as cost effective. Also, assessing the potential "softness" of public opinion on this question is difficult, and national service poll results do not appear wholly consistent with the results of the military draft poll cited earlier. Nevertheless, the pollsters concluded that "clearly such a program would alleviate any problems the armed forces might encounter in filling their ranks while at the same time providing a ready work force to meet other urgent national manpower needs."²⁵

One final question needs to be addressed in any discussion of public support for a draft. The Presidential pardon of Vietnam draft evaders, followed by an expanded program of upgrading bad discharges, has supposedly raised serious doubts about drafting young men in the

future.²⁶ The current Director of the skeleton Selective Service System said that he was unsure "whether or not we could enforce the conscription law in light of the recent amnesty."²⁷ This uncertainty is understandable. There is no empirical evidence establishing a causal relationship between pardons or amnesty and draft avoidance in subsequent conflicts. On the other hand our common sense tells us that official forgiveness of violations of past Selective Service laws will not be conducive to a future attitude of obedience. A more serious threat to any future system of conscription may well be simple non-compliance on a massive scale, as opposed to active evasion. In any event, it is unfair to predict that young Americans will refuse to serve the nation in the future simply because of the recent pardon. Instead, we should recognize that weak laws and irresolute enforcement are more apt to promote civil disobedience.

A RESERVE DRAFT: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Having covered the likely key issues in any future consideration of compulsory service alternatives, we can devote full attention to the evaluation of a draft for the Reserve Components.

Advantages

In common with other compulsory options, this alternative will guarantee that Reserve Component force structures are maintained at full strength. The technology which in recent years has brought high quality personnel management to the active forces can be applied to a revitalized Selective Service System. This would insure a high level of personnel readiness. In addition, reserve units planned for early

deployment by Mobilization Day plus 60 days (M+60) could be trained at the 110% level (including identified IRR personnel) recommended by the Total Force Study.²⁸

A second major advantage is that a reserves-only draft would provide the nation and the defense establishment with an operational manpower mobilization system capable of rapid expansion in the event of future conflict. This advantage can be partially realized simply by reactivating the Selective Service System, as will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter. However, a system already in operation, filling the reserves with inductees, would undoubtedly prove more responsive.

A third advantage would be that the entire reserve chain of command could turn its full attention to the severe problems of training and unit readiness. As noted in a previous chapter, many unit commanders spend over half their time on recruiting and retention related activities. The adverse impact of this situation must be substantial, considering the formidable constraints reserve commanders and trainers face even under ideal conditions.²⁹

The next advantage is admittedly more speculative in nature. Based on our previous discussion of conscription in the United States, it appears that a reserves-only draft would be more palatable to the American public than a full draft for the active forces. Popular perceptions of the reserves as the "second line of defense" notwithstanding, the social, economic and political impact of reserve conscription would be appreciably less severe. Again, whether this course of action would be successful depends in large measure on how it was structured, how it was administered, and how it was presented to the

American people.

A fifth advantage is also somewhat subjective and might be considered irrelevant by some. A draft for the Reserve Components would mitigate, if not reverse, the current trend of increasing isolation of the military from the rest of American society. It would expose citizens from every social and economic strata, including a generation of future national leaders, to the experience of military service. This would seem a healthy prospect in a democracy where civilian control of the military is fundamental to the system. Moreover, a reserve draft would increase the visibility, and hopefully the credibility of the military in the civilian community. At present this visibility is disturbingly low with little prospect of improvement.

Finally, a properly planned and administered Reserve Components draft could significantly enhance the appeal and effectiveness of active Army recruiting programs. The tremendous potential of this advantage will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Figure 5-1 summarizes the advantages of this alternative.

Figure 5-1

Advantages of a Reserve Draft

- Maintains reserve force structure at full strength
- Provides an in-being manpower mobilization capability
- Permits reallocation of limited time and resources to training
- Is politically preferable to a full draft for active forces
- Increases visibility and credibility of the military
- Enhances active duty recruiting when properly structured

Disadvantages

A draft for the reserves would also entail some major disadvantages which must be recognized and addressed. First, adoption of any form of conscription will open the military and the defense establishment to charges that they never fully supported the All Volunteer Force, and were therefore responsible for its failure. In fact, pronouncements of this sort are already surfacing. The truth is that the military, with very few exceptions, is the only institution or organization which has evinced any deep personal commitment to an all-volunteer force since the end of the draft in 1973. If it fails, criticism is unavoidable and will simply have to be endured; satisfaction of national security requirements will be paramount.

A second significant disadvantage of a reserve draft is that it may renew public debate on the whole philosophical question of conscription. While this may be unavoidable, the potential for controversy could be minimized through careful preparation and implementation. Moreover, most of the psychological imperatives which fueled the anti-draft movement during the Vietnam War no longer exist. The nature of a reserves-only draft, i.e., training soldiers and returning them to civilian life rather than front-line units fighting an unpopular war, would also appear to mitigate strong criticism and resentment.

Adoption of this alternative would also entail additional budgetary expenditures to support the Selective Service System and effect inductions. A detailed analysis of relative costs is beyond the scope of this study, but it should be noted that other economies would result in the recruiting and incentives areas which would offset somewhat the cost of operating the System. Another persuasive argument is

that the revitalization of the Selective Service System should be accomplished regardless of whether any inductions will take place. In that event, much of the system cost could not properly be applied against a reserve draft. As the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) study of the Reserve Components observed in 1972, "assuming a skeletal Selective Service office for the RA (Regular Army) is maintained, there would be minimal additional cost for a Reserve standby draft."³⁰

In addition, some resistance could be expected from the Army National Guard to this type of proposal. The RAC study quoted a 1972 statement by then-Director of the Selective Service Curtis W. Tarr that a reserve draft "would be bad for the Guard, and a calamity for Selective Service. The saddest part would be bringing reluctant kids into what you now consider a proud outfit."³¹ Ironically, five years later the Selective Service System is little more than a forsaken vestige and the Army National Guard is unable to fill its ranks, particularly in the combat arms. In light of recent developments, it is safe to assume that the Guard would now be more receptive to a Reserve Component draft.

The final major disadvantage focuses on the impracticality of administering a draft for the Reserve Components, and is usually the principal argument cited by critics when rejecting this option. The RAC study summarized the specific problems as follows.

...there appear to be several very practical reasons why a draft for the RC would be complicated if not completely impractical.

If a local RC unit were at authorized strength, no one in that area would be drafted. If it were below strength, the young men in the immediate area (50 miles or 90 minutes travel time) would be vulnerable to be drafted. However, in order to avoid the draft, they could move to another area where there was no RC unit or where RC units were at authorized strength.

If a young man chose to refuse induction into the local RC unit, the local police and courts would have to become involved. This could well lead to agitation to do away with the local RC

unit or failure to enforce draft actions.

Since only certain MOS requirements would have to be filled, there would be a certain amount of discrimination by skills, education, or other criteria as to who would be drafted into the local unit.³²

This argument of impracticality is sound, if a reserve draft were designed for the purpose of filling the Selected Reserve. Problems of inequity in procedures and administration would appear almost insurmountable in this scenario. All of the disadvantages cited by the RAC study dissolve, however, if the draft fills only the Individual Ready Reserve. Assignment to an IRR control group following induction and Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) renders moot most of the reasonable arguments against a Reserve Component draft. Also, the burden placed on individual inductees would be less onerous, thus facilitating public approval and acceptance. Thoughtfully constructed, incorporating an individual choice option for entry into the Selected Reserve, such a draft could fill both reserve categories. While significant, shortages in the Selected Reserve are not yet massive. Consequently, drafting for the Selected Reserve would only compound the dilemma of "Who serves when not all serve?" and exaggerate the inequities outlined earlier. A reserves-only draft to fill the IRR reduces the adverse impact to a minimum.

Despite its obvious advantages, a draft to fill the IRR could have some undesirable implications. The A.U.S.A. special manpower report considered this option carefully and concluded that it was "an intriguing but perhaps futile idea."³³ This assessment was based primarily on their estimate of likely public support.

It is doubtful that substantial public acceptance can be gained for an IRR draft because of (1) inequities growing out of the rather small numbers that would be drafted; (2) lack

of a visible emergency; and (3) the seeming inconsistency of drafting for the IRR while keeping the Active Army and Reserve Components on a volunteer footing.³⁴

While these arguments are worthy of note, it would appear that the problems of a draft for the IRR are not insurmountable, especially when compared with other alternatives available.

IMPACT ON ACTIVE DUTY RECRUITING PROGRAMS

Since it has not received wide consideration previously, the impact of a Reserve Components draft on active Army recruiting programs has not been fully assessed. Actually, it appears that adoption of this alternative could afford unique opportunities for improved active forces recruiting. The RAC study touched briefly on this point, suggesting that under a reserves-only draft "there could be the unusual situation where the Active Army could be the recipient of 'draft-induced' volunteers attempting to avoid being drafted into the Reserve Components."³⁵ Upon closer scrutiny, there appears to be no reason why this effect should not obtain and be exploited. Employing again the technique outlined in the previous section, the introduction of a voluntary option mechanism would offer to the individual facing induction an alternative. The psychological, as well as practical value of offering the potential inductee an opportunity to exercise personal choice, no matter how limited, should not be underestimated. During both the draft and AVF periods active Army recruiters successfully exploited the innate desire of the individual to have some voice in his own destiny. With proper planning, periodic adjustment, and a coordinated recruiting effort, substantial numbers of young men facing reserve induction could be induced to opt for active Army service in lieu of a protracted

reserve commitment. These actions could be further enhanced by offering the individual an opportunity, immediately following completion of IADT, to voluntarily switch to either the active Army or the Selected Reserve. Having received a taste of active duty may have removed previous hesitancy, or resistance to the military lifestyle. In Selected Reserve units still unable to maintain authorized strength, assignment of specific IRR personnel to fill vacancies would be a partial solution to present deployability deficiencies. These IRR personnel should be required to undergo two weeks of summer training each year with their units. This would also give unit personnel an opportunity to introduce the individual to the reserve unit, with a view toward possible enlistment in the Selected Reserve.

The introduction of a personal choice option is only one aspect of an integrated recruiting plan which would complement a reserves-only draft. Perhaps of greater importance would be the heightened awareness and personal interest in the military which would inevitably follow the reinstitution of any form of conscription. In their homes, schools and communities young people would become informed on service obligations and opportunities. At present, the amount of information potential enlistees receive on service opportunities is a direct function of the time, talent and tenacity of local service recruiters. In most high schools, for example, military service is considered a third-rate career choice, inherently inferior to going to college or getting a civilian job, no matter how menial. A Reserve Component draft would generate broad new interest in military service opportunities.

A reserve draft would presuppose reactivation of the Selective Service System or creation of a new agency to perform the same function.

The process of registration itself would produce both direct and indirect benefits to the active duty recruiting programs. Information could be provided to registrants through the system, and the public records of registration would serve as an invaluable source of leads for local recruiters.

In summary, it is difficult to imagine how a draft for the Reserve Components could adversely affect active Army recruiting. While the situation may not be exactly the reverse of that which existed during the active duty draft, it is highly probable that AVF recruiting would be enhanced. And careful planning of a reserve draft would maximize and balance potential benefits.

THE FUTURE OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

The once-proud, once-powerful Selective Service System is today barely a shadow of its former self. In a federal bureaucracy numbering into the hundreds of thousands, the System has been reduced to 100 full-time employees, two-thirds of whom work in Washington. Augmenting this caretaker staff are some 715 Reserve and National Guard officers who will train in FY 1978 to perform Selective Service duties in the event of future mobilization. The System's proposed FY 78 budget is a minuscule \$6.3 million and it has registered no one in almost a year and a half.³⁶ In the face of overwhelming advice to the contrary, the Ford Administration completed the virtual dismantlement of the Selective Service System. Even during the worst of the anti-draft attacks on the System no responsible critic advocated its total elimination. While recommending the creation of an all-volunteer force in 1970, the Gates Commission also recommended a standby draft

apparatus incorporating the following features.

1. A register of all males who might be conscripted when essential for national security.
2. A system for selection of inductees.
3. Specific procedures for the notification, examination and induction of those to be conscripted.
4. An organization to maintain the register and administer the procedures for induction.
5. That a standby draft can be invoked only by resolution of Congress at the request of the President.³⁷

When induction authority expired on 30 June 1973, the Selective Service continued to function. Gradually, however, its staffs and the scope of its responsibilities diminished as the AVF began to flourish. Nevertheless, a standby draft system has remained an essential part of mobilization planning. In 1975 the Total Force Study estimated that by M+180 Selective Service would have to provide 390,000 trained draftees (300,000 for the Army alone) and 137,000 Standby Reservists.³⁸ In order to meet this schedule the first inductees must begin arriving by M+30.³⁹ Adding to the System's induction burden is the statutory requirement that "a member of the Standby Reserve may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection unless the Director of Selective Service determines that the member is available for duty."⁴⁰

In 1976 the Defense Manpower Commission examined the standby draft question in detail. After observing that "the Administration has done nothing to challenge the requirement for a standby draft mechanism" since the issuance of the Total Force Study, the Commission noted "with grave concern" that:

Recent administrative actions have already emasculated any semblance of a viable standby Selective Service System. In the event of sudden major hostilities, our volunteer forces would be weakened by casualties without adequate loss replacements. In time they would be unable to conduct sustained operations, and could be annihilated.⁴¹

After a thorough inquiry the Commission recommended the following actions:

The Standby Draft System should be reconstituted with adequate funding to provide a capability to commence inductions within 30 days.

A regional capability for operating the system in the event of an emergency should be maintained.

Annual registration and initial classification of young men should be resumed.⁴²

At the present time, in 1977, the most optimistic estimates project that the first inductees would not be available until M+110. With minimum training time added, the first battlefield replacements would be available sometime after M+200.⁴³ Instead of producing the 390,000 trained draftees recommended by the Total Force Study, the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world would produce zero trained draftees by M+180. The facts and figures appear to speak for themselves. Why a conscious decision was made to allow these conditions to develop is a bewildering mystery. How long they will continue to be tolerated is another mystery.

Chapter 5

FOOTNOTES

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²⁸U.S., Department of Defense, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force (U), June, 1975 (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 7.

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³⁷President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, op. cit., p. 119.

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Chapter 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

The indefinite sustainability of the All Volunteer Force, as presently configured, has become increasingly questionable in recent months. While not yet reaching serious proportions in the active forces, recruiting shortfalls and declining accession quality have stirred awareness of the possibility of a return to some form of conscription. In the Reserve Components of the Army the situation is clearly more critical. The Army's Selected Reserve has experienced a prolonged strength decline and unabated depletion of the Individual Ready Reserve threatens to invalidate the basic manpower assumptions upon which our national security strategy is founded. Congress and the Department of Defense are attempting to develop specific remedies, while assessing the overall viability of the All Volunteer Force. In regard to the latter, a number of alternatives have been proposed which hold promise of retarding or reversing the developing manpower crisis.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study seeks to identify usable manpower alternatives and to evaluate one of them in some detail, as outlined below. Restricting this study to the active and Reserve Components of the Army is the

principal delimitation. Other components of the Total Force play vital roles, but the manpower problems of the Army are greatest in terms of both magnitude and severity.

In order to reduce this study to a manageable level, several assumptions were postulated. First, the philosophical desirability of an all-volunteer force is accepted. Second, the moral right and obligation of a nation to defend itself and, if necessary, to call upon its citizens to share the burden of that defense was not questioned. Lastly, the findings of the Defense Manpower Commission were generally assumed to be valid. By contrast, specific recommendations of the Commission were arguable.

Having established the operative constraints of the study, the hypotheses were proposed. The main hypothesis is that a draft designed to fill only the Reserve Components is a practical solution to the problem of deteriorating reserve strengths. A related subhypothesis was also developed. Specifically, a properly structured reserve draft would enhance active Army recruiting programs.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Specific findings were developed intermittently throughout the report of this study. This included a historical review of United States manpower policy, especially in the draft period; an evaluation of the current status of the All Volunteer Force and its relationship to national security; the proposal of a simplistic model of the military manpower system from which 19 separate alternatives were developed; and a brief evaluation of the relative advantages and disadvantages of each option. Finally, the study examined the feasibility of a draft

for the Reserve Components, proposed its optimum configuration, and assessed its potential impact on active Army recruiting programs.

Based on an evaluation of the data presented in previous chapters of this study, the conclusions outlined below are offered.

1. Calls for a return to any form of conscription are premature at this time.

2. Assuming that existing force structures and contingency plans are sound, the Ready Reserves (Selected and Individual) of the Army are currently experiencing manpower shortfalls which could prevent them from accomplishing their wartime missions. Without effective remedial action the present strength erosion may continue and could even accelerate.

3. The indefinite efficacy of active Army recruiting programs, as presently configured, is also questionable to a lesser degree.

4. In view of the preceding conclusions, identification and evaluation of possible manpower alternatives is prudent at this time.

5. Overall, a wide spectrum of options are available for maintaining the All Volunteer Force. This study identifies 19, some of which would require Congressional legislation, while others could be unilaterally adopted by the Departments of Defense or the Army. One package of options is recommended in the final section of this chapter.

6. A draft for the Reserve Components would broaden the limited voluntary manpower base currently accessible by the Total Force, thus enhancing the prospects for maintaining a voluntary active Army.

7. A draft designed to directly fill the Selected Reserve is probably unworkable. On the other hand, a draft to fill the Individual Ready Reserve appears to be a practical option, and one possessing

considerable potential value.

8. If some form of conscription must be enacted as a last resort, a draft to fill the Individual Ready Reserve is preferable in most respects to a draft for the active forces.

9. Reactivation of the Selective Service System, or creation of a comparable replacement apparatus, is essential. Ideally, such action should precede the arrival of a manpower crisis which would force an immediate return to conscription. The mere existence of a standby draft mechanism will enhance voluntary recruiting.

10. It is doubtful whether a national consensus will develop in the near future favoring inclusion of women in any new conscription program.

11. Reintroduction of any form of conscription should take advantage of the lessons of the Vietnam era. These include the following:

- a. Do not operate local draft boards.
- b. Establish a centrally controlled system for registration, administration and, if required, induction.
- c. Employ the random lottery method of selection for induction.
- d. Limit draft liability to one calendar year, probably that in which the 20th birthday falls.

e. Adopt a restrictive deferment/exemption policy. For example, some consideration would seem appropriate in cases of legitimate hardship or conscientious objection. On the other hand, occupational, agricultural, paternity and student deferments would be counterproductive.

f. Centralize approval authority of deferments and exemptions in order to insure uniformity nationwide.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Sequential implementation of a three-phase program to meet military manpower requirements is recommended. Phase One should be introduced immediately, with progression to subsequent phases only if dictated by the manpower situation.

Phase One actions are outlined below.

1. Immediately reactivate the Selective Service System as recommended by the Defense Manpower Commission.
2. Take the following actions to upgrade the Reserve Components.
 - a. Through statute enactment, stabilize the Reserve Components for a period of one year. This could be accomplished by extending the Standby Reserve for one year and simultaneously terminating transfers from the IRR to the Standby Reserve for at least a year. Additionally, Selected Reserve members could be required to serve their full obligations in that category pending an improved manpower picture.
 - b. Immediately enact the same six year obligation for women that men presently incur.
 - c. Enact a comprehensive program of financial incentives and expanded benefits for the Selected Reserve, recognizing that this will entail some additional costs.
 - d. Continue efforts to improve Reserve Component recruiting proficiency.
3. Take the following actions to upgrade the active forces.

- a. Restore the active Army recruiting budget to its previous (FY 1975) levels.
- b. Temporarily forego geographic representation and maximize favorable markets in a more effective manner.
- c. Expand prior service recruiting programs.
- d. Open more jobs to women only if the Army's warfighting capability is not degraded.
- e. Adjust quality standards as required. Revisions of standards, particularly mental, educational and physical, should be the sole responsibility of the respective service Chief of Staff, in consonance with his Department Secretary. The guiding principle should be the lowest standards, both individual and collective, which that service could accept without jeopardizing mission accomplishment.
This novel approach would place responsibility where it rightfully belongs, rather than in the hands of agencies and officials far removed from the realities of the battlefield.

- f. Consider expanded enlistment incentives.

- g. Improve overall retention of first-term personnel.

Phase Two actions are outlined below.

- 1. Enact a Reserve Component draft to gradually bring the IRR up to required manning levels. Incorporate a personal choice option and include incentives to motivate entry into the Selected Reserves or active forces in lieu of induction.
- 2. Discontinue Phase One actions extending periods of obligation and restricting transfers from the IRR to the Standby Reserve.
- 3. Continue Phase One actions designed to enhance voluntary recruiting.

Phase Three actions are limited to those outlined below.

1. Enact a draft to fill the active forces.
2. Discontinue those high-cost Phase One and Two actions no longer required.

If the Phase One actions proposed above are implemented as recommended, there is every reason to believe that the All Volunteer Force could prove its long-term viability. However, should these actions prove inadequate, Phases Two and Three constitute measured responses appropriate to the specific situation. In the final analysis, the national security objectives of the United States must be accorded the highest priorities. Our survival as a free and independent nation requires nothing less.

AFTERWORD

Many of the observations and assessments offered in the preceding study reflect the author's personal experiences during the creation and subsequent fruition of the All Volunteer Force. As a regimental-level special staff officer charged with the implementation of the initial Modern Volunteer Army programs, I was also responsible for unit reenlistment and participated in the first unit-of-choice recruiting efforts. During a subsequent tour with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, I was among the first group of 152 captains assigned as recruiting area commanders, spending eighteen months at the "grass-roots" level in Southern Illinois. I later served for a year as the operations officer of the St. Louis District Recruiting Command. It was during this period that I first became aware of the possibilities of a draft for the reserves.

In an attempt, however unsuccessful, to enhance the validity of this study while reducing the effects of my personal biases, manpower alternatives of a subjective or philosophical nature were not considered. Although acknowledging their potential for discussion in another forum, their scope is so imprecise that meaningful analysis would be difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, my purpose here was to recommend manpower options for the Total Force, so hopefully I may be indulged one final observation without being guilty of blatant editorializing.

In the interim between the decision to end conscription and the

actual expiration of the draft in 1973, the All Volunteer Force received limited public attention from the national leadership and media. This attention was primarily ambivalent and focused on how soon the unpopular draft could pass into oblivion. The responsibility for structuring the All Volunteer Force and recruiting young Americans to fill it was eagerly passed to the national defense establishment.

In the years since 1973, civilian leaders in the Department of Defense and senior military officers have personally led the fight to make the AVF a success. Down through the ranks, particularly in the service recruiting commands, military personnel have heavily invested their time, effort and careers, in many cases, to give the nation an All Volunteer Force.

Outside the Department of Defense, however, the AVF has been treated much the same as an illegitimate child whose parents are loath to associate with it in public. What little notice the national leadership (executive, legislative, interest elite, etc.) pays the AVF is usually negative. Oftentimes the critics are strong national defense supporters, normally sympathetic to the military, who have been opposed to the AVF since its inception. On the other hand, the noisy advocates of volunteer armed forces quickly demonstrated that they had little use for them once the draft was gone. Our leaders apparently believe that there is slight political advantage to be gained by publicly supporting the All Volunteer Force. To my knowledge (admittedly limited), since 1973 no major national or state official has ever gone on record as endorsing the AVF, or publicly encouraged his constituency to join up and make it a success. Unfortunately, this absence of

strong personal commitment is reflected by much of society in general.

When a volunteer Army was first conceived, most analysts proclaimed that active public support would be essential to its success. Although a combination of circumstances temporarily deferred that precondition, its time is now coming to pass. For the past four years the nation has had the luxury of an all-volunteer force without having to "work" for it. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the military, by themselves, cannot continue to carry this burden indefinitely. If an all-volunteer force is best for the nation, then it is worthy of the support of the nation. The national leadership, in particular, must play a leading role in this campaign if it is to be successful. As Army Times correspondent Andy Plattner noted in a recent commentary: "There is considerably more impact if President Carter says that young people should join the military than a Madison Avenue commercial selling all the great jobs in the military."¹ This philosophy should extend throughout the government, all the way down to the local level. The All Volunteer Force can still be a reality if we bring it out of the closet; money alone cannot buy it. In the face of public apathy, a return to the draft is inevitable.

¹Andy Plattner, "Leaders Could Aid Recruiting Effort," Army Times, April 18, 1977, p. 15.

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